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Abstract
We study private value auctions in which bidders may collude without using side-
payments. In our model, bidders coordinate their actions to achieve an outcome that
interim-Pareto dominates the noncooperative outcome. We characterize auctions that
are collusion-proof in the sense that no such coordination opportunities exist, and
show that the efficient and revenue maximizing auctions are not collusion-proof unless
all bidders exhibit a concave distribution of valuations. We then solve for revenue
maximizing collusion-proof auctions. If distributions of valuations are symmetric and
single-peaked, the optimal selling mechanism is a standard auction with a minimum
bid, followed by sequential negotiation in case no bidder bids above the minimum bid.
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1 Introduction
Collusion is a pervasive problem in auctions, especially in public procurement. A canonical
example is the famous “Great Electrical Conspiracy” in the 1950s, in which more than 40
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manufacturers of electrical equipment colluded in sealed bid procurement auctions, using
a bid rotation scheme also known as “phase of the moon” agreement (see Smith (1961)).
More recently, in 2012, the largest six construction companies of Korea—so-called “Big 6”
according to the competition authority—were involved in bid rigging in the Four River
Restoration Project.1 As a result, each of the Big 6 won 2 sections of the rivers while two
other companies, also part of the collusive agreement, won 1 section each.
Many bid-rigging cases uncovered by competition authorities fall into the category of
what McAfee and McMillan (1992) labeled “weak cartels,” namely cartels that do not in-
volve exchange of side payments among cartel members.2 Weak cartels usually operate by
designating a winning bidder and suppressing competition from other cartel members. The
winning bidder is designated through “market sharing” agreements (e.g., the Korean con-
struction case), through “bid rotation” whereby firms took turns in winning contracts (e.g.,
the U.S. case of electrical equipment conspiracy), or through more complicated schemes. The
designated bidders place bids somewhere around the reserve price, and bids from other cartel
members are either altogether suppressed (the practice of “bid suppression”) or submitted at
non-competitive levels (the practice of “cover bidding”).
Cartels may avoid side payments for fear that they will leave a trail of evidence for
antitrust authorities.3 Compensating losing bidders in money may also lure “pretenders”
who join a cartel solely to collect “the loser compensation” without ever intending to win.
We show in Section II of the Supplementary Material that the ability to use side payments
and reallocate the winning object (e.g., via a “knock-out” auction) adds no value to a cartel if
entry by such pretenders cannot be controlled.4 Hence, while transfers and knockout auctions
1This construction project is considered the biggest national infrastructural project in Korean history
and has received a great deal of attention. We emphasize that many large national procurement auctions
are “one-off” kind. These auctions are often so important for bidders that, even though they know they may
face each other in future auctions, they naturally perceive the interaction as a static one.
2For example, among 16 bidding rigging cases in Korea that have been filed by the Korea Fair Trade
Commission during the first half of year 2014, some evidence of side transfers was found only in 2 cases
while there was no such evidence in 8 cases. It is also unclear whether transfers have been used in other
cases. Another recent instance of a weak cartel involves producers of high voltage power cables, fined for
about 0.3 billion euros by the European Commission. According to the press release, “the European and
Asian producers would stay out of each other’s home territories and most of the rest of the world would be
divided amongst them. In implementing these agreements, the cartel participants allocated projects between
themselves according to the geographic region or customer.”
3In practice, cartels may hide side payments under different guises. For instance, Marshall et al. (1994)
suggests that members bring bogus lawsuits against one another and exchange settlements. Such settlements
must pass the scrutiny of a legal system, and must involve lawyers, so they entail transaction costs.
4If transfers cannot be used, the ability to reallocate the object (e.g., via a knockout auction) makes no
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are important features of bidding rings (see Marshall and Marx (2012)), a theory of weak
cartels is applicable far beyond environments where transfers are never used or impossible.
A key question is how weak cartels can profitability suppress competition in a way that
benefits all its members. A strong cartel can achieve this goal by promising low-value bidders
a compensation for staying out of the auction, preserving allocative efficiency. Given that
such compensation is unavailable to weak cartels, the only scope for their profitable operation
is to manipulate the allocation, sometimes allocating the good to bidders that do not have
the highest value. But since the latter entails efficiency loss, it is not clear when and how
such a distortion may benefit cartel members.
That weak cartels can indeed profitably operate was first demonstrated by McAfee and
McMillan (1992, henceforth MM). Assuming that the distribution of bidders’ valuations
exhibits increasing hazard rate, they showed that in a standard auction symmetric bidders
would benefit from agreeing, before knowing their private valuation, to randomly select a
single bidder to bid the reserve price. It also follows that the best the seller can do to respond
to such cartel behavior is to raise the reserve price. However, as we will show, this largely
negative view rests on the assumption, made by MM, that the cartel is formed ex ante, i.e.,
before bidders learn their private valuations. If bidders are already privately informed of
their values when deciding on a cartel agreement, a reasonable assumption in many settings,
they may not be willing to participate in the cartel even if the ex-ante benefit from joining
is positive.
In the current paper, we study weak cartels by explicitly considering the bidders’ interim
incentive to collude. By doing so, we offer a theory of weak cartels that differs from existing
theories, not only in terms of what auctions are susceptible to collusion and under what
conditions, but also of how a weak cartel would behave when it is active and of how the auc-
tioneer should respond to the threat of collusion. Weak cartels trade off allocative efficiency
for reduced competition, by asking their members to make bids/participation decisions that
are, to some extent, insensitive to their private valuation. The key to our characterization is
that the resulting efficiency loss is not borne uniformly across bidders with different valua-
tions. Instead, high value-bidders suffer most acutely from collusion, and are most likely to
object. Whether this loss triggers high-value bidders to reject a cartel depends on what they
expect from competitive bidding if they reject the cartel. It turns out that the (information)
rent lost by colluding will be higher when the distribution of values is convex (or its den-
difference. Further, since we assume risk neutrality for bidders, a fractional/probabilistic assignment entails
no loss of generality per se. Hence, arrangements such as counter-purchase agreements which may be used
to fine-tune market shares add no additional value to our weak cartel. In other words, our notion of a weak
cartel already subsumes such an arrangement via random assignment.
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sity is increasing). This observation leads us to identify intervals of of so-called “susceptible
types”—namely those that would benefit from colluding—based on the curvature of bidder’s
value distribution.
We consider a large class of auctions, which we call “winner-payable,” that include all
standard auctions.5 We then consider a model of collusion wherein bidders coordinate their
bidding behavior to achieve an outcome that interim-Pareto dominates (from the bidders’
perspective) the noncooperative outcome that would arise if there were no collusion. This is a
workhorse model of collusion studied by a number of authors (Laffont and Martimort (1997,
2000), Che and Kim (2006, 2009), Pavlov (2008)). As shown by Laffont and Martimort (1997,
2000), this model can be microfounded by an extensive form game in which an uninformed
but benevolent cartel-mediator proposes to all bidders a collusion scheme—a side-contract
specifying how they should bid in the auction—before they participate in the auction (but
after they learn their values); all bidders simultaneously accept or reject the plan; and in
the (on-path) event of all accepting they play the auction game according to the collusion
scheme, and in the (off-path) event of a bidder unilaterally refusing the scheme, bidders play
the auction game noncooperatively without updating their beliefs. Of particular interest is
when the cartel mediator finds no collusion scheme that would interim-Pareto dominate the
noncooperative outcome. When this happens, we call the original auction weak collusion-
proof (WCP).
We first provide a complete characterization of (winner-payable) auctions that are weak
collusion-proof. Our Theorem 1 states that a winner-payable auction is weak collusion-proof
if and only if it satisfies (1) non-wastefulness and (2) pooling on susceptible types. Non-
wastefulness requires that the good be fully assigned to some bidder whenever there is a
bidder whose valuation exceeds a reserve price. Pooling on susceptible types requires that
each bidder’s interim winning probability not vary across valuations within the same con-
nected interval of susceptible types. Roughly speaking, these two properties eliminate any
scope for the cartel to coordinate bidders’ behavior to benefit them regardless of their types.
Conversely, if either condition fails, then we can construct a bid-coordination mechanism
that interim-Pareto dominates the original auction.6 An implication of this characterization
5The formal definition is presented in Section 3. Roughly speaking, the winner payable auctions require
only winners to make positive payments and possess sufficient flexibility in payment rules for (colluding)
bidders. As will be seen, the required condition is satisfied by all standard auctions, including first-price and
second-price auctions, as well as by a wide variety of negotiation schemes.
6Note that the characterization of weak collusion-proof auctions (within the winner payable auctions)
is solely in terms of interim allocation rules they exhibit—i.e., without any regard to any other features of
the underlying auctions such as payment rules except for the reserve price of an auction. While this feature
is reminiscent of the revenue equivalence theorem, it does not follow from the usual envelope theorem
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is that efficient auctions as well as the revenue-maximizing auction (à la Myerson) are sus-
ceptible to weak cartels unless the value distributions of bidders are strictly concave (above
reserve prices).
We next study the outcome of collusion when the auction fails to be weak collusion-proof.
We demonstrate in Theorem 2 that a cartel operating according to our model implements
full assignement whenever there is a bidder whose valuation is above the reserve price and
implements a random allocation among susceptible bidder types. In other words, the two
conditions of weak collusion-proofness we have derived also characterize the optimal cartel
behavior, thus leading to a positive theory of collusion.7 This confirms and extends the
original insight of MM that random allocations are crucial tools for collusion. This result is
of practical significance in light of the prevalence of cartel practices such as bid rotation and
cover pricing, which can be seen as ways of implementing random allocations.
Compared with MM, however, our characterization of collusive behavior is richer and
more nuanced. If the density of bidders’ valuations is single-peaked, as one would expect
in many cases, only low-valuation types are susceptible, meaning that a special arrange-
ment is needed to coax high-valuation (unsusceptible) types into participating in a cartel.
Specifically, a cartel would let high-valuation bidders bid competitively, while suppressing
competition among low-valuation bidders. This kind of “semi-competitive” bidding behavior
induces a bi-modal distribution of bids: bids are concentrated around the reserve price and
around higher, more competitive, levels. We believe this observation is useful in guiding
empirical efforts to identify the presence of a cartel in auctions or to estimate bidders’ pref-
erences in its presence. Moreover, the collusive behavior described above divides the spoils
of collusion asymmetrically across bidder types. Asymmetric treatment of cartel members
is not unusual in practice, even for firms that compete within the same geographical and
product market. For instance, in their empirical analysis of a Canadian gasoline cartel, Clark
and Houde (2013) document how firms were sharing collusive profits asymmetrically, without
using explicit monetary transfer, but by allowing selected cartel members to undercut prices
for specific periods of time.
argument. In fact, this feature of collusion-proofness characterization rests on the weak collusion-proofness
(and the winner payability of the underlying auction), which in turn involves a careful construction of a
bid-coordination scheme in case an allocation rule fails either (1) or (2). The tractactiblility it offers in
checking an auction’s susceptibility to collusion can be seen as an advantage of the weak collusion-proofness
notion.
7Formally, this result amounts to the so-called collusion-proofness principle: it is without loss of gener-
ality to focus one’s attention to auction rules that are weak collusion-proof. Plainly, the same behavioral
outcome characterized by (1) and (2) emerges whether or not the auctioneer deters, or allows for, collusion.
An analogous result is established by LM.
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The complete characterization of collusion-proof auctions enables us to study the fol-
lowing normative question: How should one design an auction in the presence of a weak
cartel? Restricting attention to winner-payable auctions, we identify the optimal collusion-
proof auction for the seller up to the choice of the individual reserve prices (Theorem 3).
The optimal mechanism allocates the good to maximize the virtual value functions that are
suitably ironed out for the susceptible types. An interesting feature of the optimal mecha-
nism is asymmetric treatment of bidders who are ex-ante identical. For instance, when the
bidders’ value distributions are convex, the optimal mechanism takes the form of a sequential
negotiation: the seller engages in a take-it-or-leave-it negotiation with each of the bidders
sequentially in a predetermined order.
In the case of a single-peaked density, the optimal (collusion-proof) mechanism consists
of an auction with reserve price followed by a negotiation with individual bidders if the
auction ends without sale. This is reminiscent of the way public-procurement auctions are
conducted in Italy. In fact, public procurement laws in Italy allow buyers to start a direct
negotiation with potential sellers if the initial competitive tendering fails to deliver any bid
clearing the reserve price. The outcome of this negotiation can end up being a price higher
than the originally set reserve price.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we illustrate our main
results via two simple examples. Then, section 3 introduces the class of “winner payable” auc-
tion rules that we study and the model of collusion. Section 4 characterizes the susceptibility
of auctions to weak cartels. Section 5 characterizes optimal collusion-proof auctions. Section
6 discusses related literature. Section 7 concludes. Appendices A-B and Supplementary
Material contain all the proofs not presented in the main body of the paper.
2 Illustrative Examples
We first illustrate via simple examples how bidders’ interim incentives to participate in weak
cartels—as opposed to ex-ante incentives—affect the formation of cartels and their behavior.
We present two examples here, and others will be interspersed throughout the analysis.
Example 1. Suppose there are two bidders vying for a single object in a second-price
auction with zero reserve price. Each bidder has a valuation drawn from the interval [0, 1]
according to a distribution function F (v) = 1− (1− v)2. Its hazard rate f
1−F is increasing,
and, according to MM, this implies that bidders would benefit ex ante from a weak cartel.
8 See Decarolis and Giorgiantonio (2015) for more details on the Italian public procurement regulation.
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Specifically, if bidders were to bid non-cooperatively, both bidding their values, each bidder
would earn an ex-ante payoff of 2
15
, but if they form a cartel and select one bidder at random
to win the object at zero price, each would enjoy a strictly higher ex-ante payoff of 1
6
.
However, if bidders have private information at the cartel formation stage, then the
fact that a cartel is beneficial ex-ante need not guarantee it will be beneficial to all types.
To see this, suppose initially that both bidders participate in the cartel regardless of their
valuations. And suppose the cartel has each bidder win with probability one half at zero
price. Then, a bidder would enjoy the “interim” payoff of v
2
if his valuation is v.
Suppose the same bidder refuses to join the cartel. Then, the cartel collapses, and in
the ensuing noncooperative play, each bidder employs a dominant strategy of bidding his
valuation. The bidder would earn the “interim” payoff of
U0(v) :=
∫ v
0
(v − s)dF (s) = v2 − v
3
3
.
As depicted in Figure 1, U0(v) > v/2 if v > 1
2
(
3−√3) =: v¯0. That is, any bidder with
valuation greater than v¯0 will be better off from refusing to join the cartel.
v
v¯0v¯1
v
2
U1(v)
U0(v)
Figure 1: Cartel Unraveling
Given this, bidders may attempt to form a cartel that only operates when their valuations
are both less than v¯0. Will such a “partial cartel” form? The answer is no. To see this, suppose
to the contrary that a cartel forms if and only if the bidders’ values are both less than v¯0.
Also, suppose the cartel operates as before, randomly selecting a winner and having the
loser bid zero. Given the agreement, the bidder will enjoy the interim payoff of v
2
as before,
conditional on a cartel having been formed. But given the same event (i.e., his opponent
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having v < v¯0), he would have earned
U1(v) =
∫ v
0
(v − s)dF (s)
F (v¯0)
if he refused to join the cartel and bid his valuation in the noncooperative play. It turns out
that U1(v) > v/2 if and only if v > 1
2
(
3−
√
9− 12v¯0 + 6v¯20
)
=: v¯1, which is strictly less
than v¯0, as described in Figure 1. In other words, no bidder with valuation v ∈ (v¯1, v¯0] will
participate in the cartel.
Arguing recursively in this manner, one can see that no types of bidders are willing to
participate in the cartel. Any cartel unravels. We shall later show that this is due to the
density f being decreasing. Intuitively, declining density means that a higher valuation type
forgoes relatively more from a non-cooperative play, in terms of the chance of winning the
good. This creates the iterative process of high valuation types successively dropping out of
collusion, leading to a full collapse, despite the fact that it is beneficial ex-ante.
Example 2. We next consider a situation in which a cartel is sustainable, but the way a
cartel operates is crucially affected by the interim participation constraints. Suppose again
two bidders participate in a second-price auction to obtain an object. Each bidder draws
his valuation from a triangular distribution F with density f(v) = 8v if v ∈ [0, 1/4] and
f(v) = 8
3
(1− v) if v ∈ [1/4, 1]. The hazard rate is increasing everywhere, so bidders ex-ante
payoff would be maximized by a random allocation, as shown by MM. However, since the
density is decreasing in [1/4, 1], a random allocation is not implementable by the cartel.9
Unlike the previous example, the density is not decreasing everywhere, and this feature
will ensure profitability of a cartel, as our results in Section 4 will show. Such a cartel
will, however, require a different arrangement than complete pooling (which violates interim
participation constraint for high types, as showed by the dotted line crossing the non-collusive
9To see this, suppose that the bidders form a cartel and randomly allocate the object between them. A
bidder will then earn the payoff of v/2 if his valuation is v. Suppose the same bidder refuses to join a cartel.
From the ensuing non-cooperative bidding, the bidder will earn the payoff of
U(v) =
∫ v
0
(v − s)dF (s) =
∫ v
0
F (s)ds, (1)
where
F (v) =
4v2 if v ∈ [0, 1/4]− 13 + 83v − 43v2 if v ∈ [1/4, 1]. (2)
A simple calculation reveals that U(v) > v/2 for v sufficiently close to 1 (which is shown in Figure 2),
meaning that a high valuation bidder will refuse to join such a cartel.
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payoff in Figure 2). Suppose the cartel has each participating member send a cheap talk
message, either H or L, depending on whether their values are above or below v˜ = 1/2,
respectively. Their bids are then coordinated as follow. Call a bidder who send message
j = H,L a j-bidder. Then, an H-bidder is instructed to bid his value. An L-bidder is
instructed to bid 3
4
v, given his value v, if his opponent is an H-bidder (which prevents L
from mimicking H). If both bidders are L-bidders, then one of them is chosen randomly to
bid his value, and other bids zero.
This cartel arrangement implements pooling for bidders with v < v˜ = 1/2, and com-
petitive bidding for bidders with v > v˜ = 1/2. Unlike complete pooling, this arrangement
induces participation by all types. As can be seen in Figure 2, collusive payoff U˜ exceeds the
non-collusive payoff U (specified in (1)) for all v.10 Later we shall show (Theorem 2) that
v
Interim
payoff
1
2
U˜(v)
U(v)
1
2
v
Figure 2: Profitability of Cartel Manipulation
the above cartel behavior is Pareto optimal among all sustainable cartel behaviors.
10Under the collusive arrangement, a type-v bidder obtains the object with probability
Q˜(v) :=

F (v˜)
2 =
1
3 if v ≤ v˜
F (v) if v > v˜,
and enjoys the payoff of
U˜(v) :=
 13v if v ≤ v˜1
3 v˜ +
∫ v
v˜
F (s)ds if v > v˜.
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3 Model
3.1 Environment
A risk-neutral seller has a single object for sale. The seller’s valuation of the object is
normalized at zero. There are n ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders, and N := {1, ..., n} denotes the set
of bidders. We assume that bidder i is privately informed of his valuation of the object, vi,
drawn from an interval Vi := [vi, vi] ⊂ R+ according to a strictly increasing and continuous
cumulative distribution function Fi (with density fi).11 We let V := ×i∈NVi and assume that
bidders’ valuations are independently distributed. Each bidder’s payoff from not obtaining
the object and paying (or receiving) no money is normalized to zero.
The object is sold via an auction. An auction is defined by a triplet, A := (B, ξ, τ), where
B := ×i∈NBi is a profile of message spaces (with Bi being i’s message space), ξ : B → Q is a
rule mapping a vector of messages (“bids”) to a (possibly random) allocation of the object in
Q := {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n|
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1}, and τ : B → Rn+ is a rule determining expected
payments as a function of the messages. Let ξi and τi be i-th element of ξ and τ that
corresponds to the allocation and payment rule for bidder i, respectively. We assume that
the seller cannot force bidders to participate in the auction. Therefore, for each bidder, we
require the message space Bi to include a non-participation option, b0i , which, when exercised,
results in no winning and no payment for bidder i, ξi(b0i , ·) := τi(b0i , ·) = 0.
It is useful to define the set Bi = {b ∈ B|ξi(b) > 0} of bid profiles that lead bidder i to
win with positive probability. (This set is assumed throughout to be nonempty.) Bidder i’s
reserve price under A is then defined as
ri := inf
{
τi(b)
ξi(b)
≥ 0
∣∣∣∣b ∈ Bi} , (3)
the minimum per-unit price bidder i must pay to win with positive probability. Likewise,
the maximum per-unit price bidder i could pay under auction A is given by
Ri := sup
{
τi(b)
ξi(b)
≤ vi
∣∣∣∣b ∈ Bi} .
Whether and how a cartel operates in an auction depends crucially on the details of its
allocation and payment rule. Che and Kim (2009) show that if the seller faces no constraints
in designing an auction, any outcome that involves no sale with sufficient probability can be
11Following Myerson (1981), we could add a common value component to the private valuations, by
assuming that such component is common knowledge. In this case, our analysis remains unchanged. If
bidders have private signals on the common value, however, collusion may facilitate information sharing, as
pointed out by Hendricks et al. (2008). The analysis of this latter case is outside the scope of our paper.
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implemented even in the presence of a cartel that can use side payment and even reallocate
the object ex-post. The idea is to force the cartel to accept a fixed price (i.e., “selling the firm
to the cartel”). This eliminates the scope for the cartel to manipulate the outcome. However,
implementing this idea requires losing bidders to make payments as well—a feature seldom
observed in practice.
In the current paper, we thus focus on more realistic auction formats in which losing
bidders make no payments. Specifically, we restrict attention to a set A∗ of auction rules
that are winner-payable in the following sense.
Definition 1. An auction A is winner-payable if, for all i ∈ N , there exist bid profiles
bi, b
i ∈ Bi such that ξi(bi) = ξi(bi) = 1, τi(bi) = ri, τi(bi) = Ri, and τj(bi) = τj(bi) = 0, for
j 6= i.
In words, an auction is winner-payable if it is possible for bidders to coordinate their
bids (possibly including non-participation) so that any given bidder can win the object for
sure at the minimum per-unit price ri (i.e., his reserve price) or at the maximum per-unit
price Ri allowed by the bidding rule, and the other (losing) bidders pay nothing. Most of
commonly observed auctions are winner-payable. Examples include first-price (or Dutch)
auctions, second-price (or English) auctions, possibly with any reserve prices, and sequential
take-it-or-leave-it offers.12
We note that our main result (Theorem 1) applies beyond winner-payable auctions as
long as only the winner of the auction pays for the object and its equilibrium allocation is
deterministic (i.e. for each profile of bids, the object is assigned with probability one to only
one of the bidders, whenever it is assigned), or randomization is limited to tie-breaking and
occurs with zero probability.
3.2 Characterization of Collusion-Free Outcomes
In the absence of collusion, an auction rule A in A∗ induces a game of incomplete information
where all bidders simultaneously submit messages (i.e. bids) to the seller. A pure strategy
for player i is denoted βi : Vi → Bi, and β = (β1, · · · , βn) denotes a profile of strategies.
12Lotteries represent a notable exception. For instance, consider a mechanism where there is a fixed
number n ≥ 2 of lottery tickets, each bidder can buy a single ticket at a fixed price p ∈ R+, the auctioneer
retains the unsold tickets, and the object is assigned to the holder of a randomly selected ticket. In this
mechanism, Bi := {0, 1}, ξi(0, b−i) = τi(0, b−i) = 0, ξi(1, b−i) = 1/n, and τi(1, b−i) = p. Winner-payability
fails as there is no message profile that can guarantee the object to any of the players. On the other hand,
fixed-prize raffles (see Morgan (2000)) are winner-payable.
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Given a profile of equilibrium bidding strategies β∗ of an auction A, its outcome cor-
responds to a direct mechanism MA ≡ (q, t) : V → Q × Rn, where for all v ∈ V ,
q(v) = ξ(β∗(v)) is the allocation rule for the object and t(v) = τ(β∗(v)) is the payment rule.
Given MA, we define the interim winning probability Qi(vi) = Ev−i [qi(vi, v−i)] and interim
payment Ti(vi) = Ev−i [ti(vi, v−i)] for bidder i ∈ N with type vi ∈ Vi. We will refer to the
mapping Q = (Qi)i∈N and T = (Ti)i∈N as interim allocation and transfer rules, respectively.
The equilibrium payoff of player i with value vi is then expressed as
UMAi (vi) := Qi(vi)vi − Ti(vi).
Any collusion-free equilibrium outcome MA must be incentive compatible (by def-
inition of equilibrium) and individually rational (because bidders are offered the non-
participation option). That is, for all i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi,
UMAi (vi) ≥ viQi(v˜i)− Ti(v˜i), for all v˜i ∈ Vi, (IC)
UMAi (vi) ≥ 0. (IR)
As is well known, (IC) and (IR) are equivalent to the following conditions:
Qi is nondecreasing, ∀i ∈ N ; (M)
Ti(vi) = viQi(vi)−
∫ vi
vi
Qi(s)ds+ Ti(vi)− viQi(vi),∀vi ∈ Vi, ∀i ∈ N ; (Env)
UMAi (vi) = viQi(vi)− Ti(vi) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N. (IR′)
In the later analysis, we often restrict attention to direct mechanisms (that may not be
winner-payable). This restriction is without loss, however, as is shown next:
Lemma 1. Given any direct mechanism M = (q, t) that satisfies (IC) and (IR), there is
a winner-payable auction rule A ∈ A∗ whose equilibrium outcome yields the same interim
outcome as M .
Proof. See Section I of the Supplementary Material.
3.3 Models of Collusion
Members of a weak cartel can only coordinate the bids submitted to the seller. Since non-
participation is regarded as a possible bid in our model, this means that the bidders can also
coordinate on their participation decisions. We abstract from the question of how a cartel
12
can enforce an agreement among its members, but rather focus on whether there will be an
incentive compatible agreement that is beneficial for all bidders.13
Formally, a cartel agreement is a mapping α : V → ∆(B) that specifies a lottery
over possible bid profiles in auction A for each profile of valuations for the bidders. A
cartel agreement leads bidders to play a game of incomplete information where each player’s
strategy is to report his type to the cartel and then outcomes are determined by the lottery
α over bids and auction rule A. By the revelation principle, it is without loss to restrict
attention to cartel agreements that make bidders report their true valuation to the mediator.
Hence, for any cartel agreement α, one can equivalently consider the direct mechanism it
induces.
Definition 2. A direct mechanism M˜A = (q˜, t˜) is a cartel manipulation of A if there
exists a cartel agreement α such that
q˜i(v) = Eα(v)[ξi(b)] and t˜i(v) = Eα(v)[τi(b)],∀v ∈ V , i ∈ N, (4)
where Eα(v)[·] denotes the expectation taken using the probability distribution α(v) ∈ ∆(B).
Since M˜A results from bidders’ equilibrium play in the incomplete information game
described above, it is incentive compatible, or satisfies (IC).14
Our goal is to investigate whether any auction A ∈ A∗ is susceptible to some cartel
manipulation M˜A. To this end, we must first identify the set of cartel manipulations that
would be agreed upon by the bidders in auction A. In a fully game-theoretic approach, this
would require analyzing how the auction would proceed if some bidder refused to participate
in a proposed manipulation. The latter in turn depends on the beliefs the refusing bidder
and other bidders form against each other.
To address these issues, we follow the model of collusion proposed by Laffont and Mar-
timort (1997) and studied further by Laffont and Martimort (2000), Che and Kim (2006,
2009), Pavlov (2008), and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) in various contexts. This model
postulates that all bidders play an auxiliary cartel game before the auction takes place. In
the cartel game, an uninformed third party proposes a (possibly “null”) cartel agreement
and all bidders, after privately observing their valuations, simultaneously and independently
decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. If all bidders accept the proposal, then
13This is consistent with MM and LM and most of the literature analyzing static models of collusion in
auctions.
14The condition (IC) holds for all Bayes Nash equilibria. While dynamic nature of the game may impose
additional restriction on cartel manipulation (in the form of sequential rationality), any such behavior must
also satisfy (IC). In this sense, the current approach is permissive about a possible cartel manipulation.
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the cartel agreement comes into force and bidders are committed to play the agreement; if
any bidder rejects the proposal then the original auction is played. One then focuses on
an equilibrium in which the third-party mediator always propose a (possibily a null) cartel
agreement that weakly interim-Pareto dominates the noncooperative outcome, bidders all
accept the agreement, and in the off-path event of a bidder unilaterally rejecting the agree-
ment, they play the noncooperative auction game without updating their prior beliefs about
their opponents’ types. That is, a passive belief is assumed off the path when collusion
breaks down unexpectedly.15
Since noncooperative play under prior beliefs yields payoff UMAi (vi) and cartel manipu-
lation M˜A of auction A yields U M˜Ai (vi), the manipulation is profitable if it satisfies (IC)
and
U M˜Ai (vi) ≥ UMAi (vi),∀vi, i, with strict inequality for some vi, i, (C-IR)
where MA is the collusion-free outcome at auction A. The susceptibility of auction to weak
cartels is defined in the following way:
Definition 3. An equilibrium outcome MA of an auction A is weakly collusion-proof
(or WCP) if it does not admit a profitable cartel manipulation.
According to this definition, an auction is susceptible to bidder collusion if and only
if there exists a cartel manipulation that interim Pareto dominates its collusion-free out-
come.16 This condition provides a reasonable test for the collusion-proofness of an auction
rule. The presence of an interim Pareto dominating manipulation would make it a common
knowledge that everyone will gain from collusion (as argued by Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983)), making cartel-forming a clear cause for concern. By contrast, its absence would
mean that no consensus exists among bidders to form a cartel.17 We initially use WCP to
15This assumption has been adopted widely in the collusion literature, including the papers mentioned
above. The assumption disciplines bidders’ beliefs after a breakdown of collusion, by preventing them from
being too pessimistic or optimistic about each other. The passive belief assumptions is also widely used in
the contracting literature.
16Definition 3 implies that at least one type of one bidder must have a strict incentive to accept the cartel
manipulation. If that was not the case, then the manipulation would yield exactly the same outcome as the
original auction, including the same revenue for the seller. In this case, collusion would not be a concern.
17 Not only is the assumed behavior a reasonable description of how cartels may operate, but the model
also permits a now familiar auction-theoretic analytics pioneered by Meyerson: as will be seen, the constraint
collusion imposes on a mechanism is characterized entirely via the interim allocation rule induced by the
mechanism up to the choice of a reserve price, and thus can be tractably incorporated into a mechanism
design framework. This enables us to explore an optimal auction in the presence of collusion, as will be done
in Section 5.
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study susceptibility (or lack thereof) of an auction to cartels. But later, we establish the
collusion-proofness principle (Theorem 1 and Corollary 5), which will validate WCP as a
notion of equilibrium outcome in the presence of collusion, whether collusion is deterred or
not, that is, whether an auction rule is WCP or not.
Throughout, our analysis focuses on weak cartels. Weak cartels are characterized by two
important restrictions on their behavior that differentiate them form strong cartels. First,
they are unable to use side payments to compensate losers. Second, they cannot reallocate
the object once it leaves the seller’s hand. While realistic in many settings, these limitations
are non-trivial. Therefore, one might expect that strong cartels will always serve collusive
bidders better then weak cartels. For instance, transfers could be used to prevent the sort of
cartel unraveling described in Section 2, by providing compensation for high-value bidders
and allowing them to join the cartel. This is not necessarily the case. As we formally show
in Section II of the Supplementary Material, a winner-payable auction that is resistant to
weak cartels is also resistant to strong cartels, if bidders with values below the reserve price
do not expect a positive payoff from joining the strong cartel, a condition labeled entry
exclusion constraint (or EEC). Given this additional condition, all our results in sections 4
and 5 remain valid even for strong cartels.
The EEC condition is natural. As MM pointed out, a strong cartel would be reluctant to
pay off non-serious bidders, especially when their entry in the cartel can not be controlled.
If positive compensation is offered to low-value bidders that would never make a profit in
the auction, then they will all wish to enter the market solely to receive the compensation.
And if a large pool of low-value bidders exists, then this would dissipate collusive rents for
serious bidders.
4 When Are Auctions Susceptible to Weak Cartels?
In this section, we first characterize outcomes of winner-payable auction that are susceptible
to a weak cartel, and then show that the characterization also identifies optimal cartel
behavior at such susceptible auctions.
4.1 Conditions for Weak Cartel Susceptibility
We begin by introducing one key definition.
Definition 4. For each i ∈ N and r ∈ [vi, vi], the concave closure of Fi is: for each
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v ∈ [ri, v¯i],
Gi(v; ri) := max{sFi(v′) + (1− s)Fi(v′′)|s ∈ [0, 1], v′, v′′ ∈ [ri, vi], and sv′ + (1− s)v′′ = v}.
In words, the concave closure Gi(·; ri) is the lowest concave function above Fi(·) for all
[ri, vi].18 (To simplify notation, we will henceforth write Gi(·; ri) as Gi.) Figure 3 depicts
the concave closure Gi for a value distribution Fi that has a single-peaked density. Concave
closure Gi is always linear on regions where Fi is linear or convex, but it may also be
linear in areas where Fi is concave. Note that each concave function Gi admits density,
denoted gi(v), for almost every v ∈ [ri, vi], whose derivative is well defined and satisfies
g′i(v) ≤ 0 for almost every v ∈ [ri, vi]. For each bidder i, we call susceptible types the set
V0i (ri) := {v ≥ ri|g′i(v) = 0} —namely a subset of types above ri where the concave closure
is linear. In Figure 3, the susceptible types are an interval [ri, v∗(ri)], while in general the
set V0i (ri) is a collection of disjoint intervals.
The intuition provided in the introduction suggests that susceptible types are prone to a
cartel manipulation. This is formalized in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a winner-payable auction rule A ∈ A∗.
1. (Necessity) Its equilibrium outcome MA is weakly collusion-proof if MA’s interim allo-
cation rule Q satisfies the following properties:
(i) Non-wastenefullness:
∑
i∈N
qi(v) = 1 if vi > ri for some i ∈ N ; (NW)
(ii) Pooling on susceptible types: Qi(vi) = Qi(v′i) if [vi, v
′
i] ⊂ V0i (ri), ∀i ∈ N. (PS)
2. (Sufficiency) The converse also holds if, in addition to (PS) and (NW), A satisfies
ri ≥ vi for all i ∈ N .
Proof. See Appendix A (page 31).
The condition that ri ≥ vi for all i ∈ N is fairly natural. In fact, preventing the
auctioneer from designing auctions that violate it is without loss of generality when the
objective is revenue or welfare maximization.19
18We stress that Gi depends not only on type distribution Fi but also indirectly on the specific auction
rule, which determines ri.
19 Indeed, one can show that for any auction rule A ∈ A∗ whose outcome MA = (q, t) is WCP, there
is a direct auction mechanism A′ that satisfies ri ≥ vi,∀i ∈ N , and whose outcome is WCP and achieves
the same allocation and as much revenue for the seller as MA does. The proof of this result is provided in
Section III of the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 3: Type Distribution F and Its Concave Closure G
Weak collusion proofness requires that the object be fully allocated whenever there is a
bidder whose valuation exceeds a reserve price (condition (NW)), and that a bidder’s winning
probability is constant for susceptible types (condition (PS)).
To understand the necessity of this latter condition, suppose that in some (collusion-free)
equilibrium, bidder i’s winning probability Qi(vi) is strictly increasing within [a, b].20 Now,
consider a cartel manipulation, labeled M˜A, that: (i) leaves unchanged the interim winning
probability and expected payments of all bidders other than bidder i and also of bidder i
when his value is outside [a, b] and (ii) gives the good to bidder i with a constant probability
p¯ if his value is inside [a, b], where
p¯ =
∫ b
a
Qi(s)fi(s)ds
Fi(b)− Fi(a) , (5)
that is, bidder i’s average winning probability over the interval [a, b] in MA.
We investigate when this manipulation is uniformly profitable to all types—namely, when
(C-IR) holds for all v ∈ [a, b]. This means that each type v ∈ [a, b] must be getting at least
its noncooperative payoff, which by (Env) equals
UMA(v) = UMA(a) +
∫ v
a
Qi(s)ds. (6)
Since Q is nondecreasing, this payoff is convex, as is described in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). For
the cartel manipulation to be profitable, its payoff U M˜A(v) must lie above the noncooperative
20The explanation here also provides some intuition for the sufficiency of (CP) (together with the other
conditions). The proof, however, requires a different argument since the auction must be resistant to all
manipulations, not just the one considered here
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payoff UMA(v) for all v ∈ [a, b], namely the shaded area in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). Since the
manipulation randomizes assignment for types [a, b], the cartel payoff U M˜A(v) is linear for
the affected types, so the constraint is most binding for the highest affected type v = b, as
can be seen clearly in the figures. By (Env), we can rewrite the cartel payoff for type v:
U M˜A(v) = U M˜A(a) +
∫ v
a
Q˜(s)ds = UMA(a) +
∫ v
a
p¯ds
= UMA(a) + (v − a)
∫ b
a
Qi(s)fi(s)ds
Fi(b)− Fi(a) . (7)
Combining (6) and (7), the crucial question is whether∫ b
a
Qi(s)ds ≤ (b− a)
∫ b
a
Qi(s)fi(s)ds
Fi(b)− Fi(a) ,
namely, whether the conditional winning probability “contributed” by the affected types (the
right hand side) is large enough to match the noncooperative rent (the left hand side).
This last question depends on the shape of the density function f . If f is (conditionally)
uniform on [a, b], then the two sides are equal, satisfying (C-IR) for all affected types. If f
is increasing in [a, b], this means that high types are relatively more abundant within [a, b]
than in the uniform case. Since higher types enjoy higher winning probability under MA,
this means that the winning probability contributed is larger. Hence, (C-IR) holds strictly
for all types [a, b], as depicted in Figure 4(a). Indeed, this is precisely when the concave
closure G is linear, and the types [a, b] become susceptible. In this case, a cartel succeeds.
By the same token, if f is declining (i.e., the concave closure G is strictly concave), the exact
opposite is true, and (C-IR) fails for types close to v = b, as depicted in Figure 4(b). In this
case, a cartel fails to form.
Even when a manipulation M˜A is profitable (as in Figure 4(a)), implementing it can still
be challenging for a weak cartel. In fact, pooling the types of bidder i in [a, b] requires shifting
the winning probability away from high value types toward low value types of bidder i, and
it is not clear whether and how such a shifting of the winning probabilities can be made
incentive compatible without using transfers. Without transfers, a cartel must coordinate
its members’ bids in the right way to replicate the exact interim transfers necessary to make
M˜A incentive compatible. Winner-payability of an auction plays a role here: it allows the
cartel to find, for each profile of reported values, a distribution of bids that implements the
ex post allocation and transfers needed for the proposed manipulation. 21
21To see this point observe that the cartel is able to assign an arbitrary winning probability to each
bidder i by combining the non-participation option with bids bi and b
i
. Moreover, whenever i is assigned
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(b) Gi strictly concave on [a, b]
Figure 4: Profitability of Weak-Cartel Manipulation
Theorem 1 suggests that a winner-payable auction which assigns the object with higher
probability to bidders with higher values is vulnerable to weak cartels unless each bidder’s
value distribution is strictly concave for all types that obtain the good with positive probabil-
ity. The next three corollaries state (under certain technical qualifications) that (i) standard
auctions, (ii) revenue maximizing auctions (i.e. those which implement Myerson’s optimal
auction), and (iii) efficient auctions are all susceptible to weak cartels unless all distributions
of values are strictly concave.
Corollary 1. Letting v := mini∈N vi and v := maxi∈N vi, assume that v > v. Then, the
collusion-free equilibrium outcomes (in weakly undominated strategies) of first-price, second-
price, English, or Dutch auctions, with a reserve price r < v, are not WCP if Gi is linear in
some interval (a, b) ⊂ Vi with b > r and a ≥ v for some bidder i.
Proof. See Appendix A (page 40).
Corollary 2. Suppose that the virtual valuation, Ji(vi) := vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , is strictly increasing
in vi for all i ∈ N . Suppose also that Gi is linear in some interval (a, b) ⊂ (ri, vi], Ji(b) > 0,
and maxj 6=i Jj(vj) < Ji(b) < maxj 6=i Jj(vj), for some bidder i. Then, all equilibrium outcomes
of auctions in A∗ that maximize the seller’s revenue are not WCP.
the object, the cartel can induce any payment which is a convex combination of ri (the minimum per-unit
price that i could ever pay at the auction) and Ri (the maximum price that i could pay) by using bi and
b
i
. Winner-payability is thus sufficient for the cartel to attain any incentive compatible allocation for values
above reserve prices. Therefore, enlarging the set of auctions beyond A∗ would not make collusion any easier
for the cartel.
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Proof. The hypotheses guarantee that there exists an interval [b − , b] with  > 0, where
Qi(vi) is strictly increasing in the optimal auction. The result follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3. Suppose that Gi is linear in some interval (a, b) ∈ (ri, vi] and maxj 6=i vj <
b < maxj 6=i vj, for some bidder i. Then, all efficient equilibrium outcomes of auctions in A∗
whose are not WCP.
Proof. The hypotheses guarantee that there exists an interval [b − , b] with  > 0, where
Qi(vi) is strictly increasing in any efficient auction. The result follows from Theorem 1.
On the flip side, we can identify conditions under which the auctions discussed in the
previous corollaries are WCP.
Corollary 4. If Fi is strictly concave for all i ∈ N , then the following are WCP: (i)
the collusion-free equilibria of first-price, second-price, English, or Dutch auctions, with or
without reserve price (ii) any equilibrium of any auction that results in an efficient allocation,
and (iii) any equilibrium of any auction that maximizes the seller’s revenue.
Proof. The proof is immediate given Theorem 1 and the fact that there is no interval in Vi
for any i ∈ N where Gi is linear.
4.2 Optimal Cartel Behavior
Understanding how a cartel operates is important for evaluating its outcome and for detecting
its presence. As it turns out, the preceding characterization helps us to understand how a
cartel operates, which in turn provides some clue on how one may empirically detect a cartel.
When a weak cartel is formed, it is natural to expect that it will seek to avoid outcomes
that are suboptimal in a Pareto sense. Therefore, our positive analysis focuses on cartel
behavior that is interim Pareto efficient, defined formally as follows.
Definition 5. Suppose an equilibrium outcome of MA auction A is not WCP. A profitable
cartel manipulation M˜A of A is cartel-optimal if it is not interim Pareto dominated by
another cartel manipulation: i.e., there does not exist another cartel manipulation M˜ ′A such
that
U
M˜ ′A
i (vi) ≥ U M˜Ai (vi),∀vi, i, with strict inequality for some vi, i. (8)
The next result, which is analogous to the collusion-proofness principle of LM, follows
from observing that if the cartel manipulation M˜A is cartel optimal, then any auction that
induces M˜A as equilibrium behavior is also WCP according to Definition 3.
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Theorem 2. Suppose auction A ∈ A∗ is not weakly collusion-proof. Then a profitable cartel
manipulation M˜A of A is cartel-optimal if and only if it satisfies (PS) and (NW).
Proof. To prove the sufficiency, suppose by way of contradiction that a profitable cartel
manipulation M˜A satisfying (PS) and (NW) is not optimal. Then, there exists a profitable
cartel manipulation M˜ ′A of A that interim Pareto dominates M˜A in the sense defined by
(8). Since M˜ ′A is a cartel manipulation of A with respect to MA, and since M˜A is also
a cartel manipulation of A, it follows that M˜ ′A must be a cartel manipulation in turn of
M˜A in the sense of satisfying (4) with respect to the bidding behavior specified by M˜A.
Since M˜A satisfies (PS) and (NW), Theorem 1 suggests that M˜A is weak collusion proof,
or does not admit a further profitable manipulation, which implies that M˜ ′A cannot interim
Pareto dominates M ′A in the sense of (8). The necessity follows from the same argument
applied in the reverse order. If cartel manipulation M˜A does not satisfies (PS) and (NW),
it in turn admits a profitable cartel manipulation M˜ ′A. Since the latter is in turn a cartel
manipulation of the original auction A and interim Pareto dominates M˜A, the latter cannot
be cartel-optimal.
Combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 provides a powerful prediction of the allocation
that would emerge in the presence of a cartel.
Corollary 5. In the presence of collusion that implements a cartel-optimal manipulation,
the equilibrium outcome of any auction A ∈ A∗ must satisfy (PS) and (NW).
The predicted collusive behavior is much richer and more nuanced than the simple random
allocation at the reserve price predicted by MM. In our model, for any specific auction that
is not collusion-proof, there is typically a range of optimal collusive behaviors that may differ
in terms of revenue and efficiency.
To see this, consider an example where there are two bidders, each with value drawn
from [0, 1] according to the triangular density: f(v) = 4v for v ≤ 1/2 and f(v) = 4(1−v) for
v > 1/2. Suppose the seller naively employs a standard auction with a reserve price 0.4—an
optimal level assuming no collusion. Given this auction, there exists a family of cartel-optimal
manipulations, indexed by v˜ ∈ [0.541, 0.6], whereby types in [r, v˜] pool (i.e., submit the same
bid), and types [v˜, v] bid competitively. Interestingly, optimal cartel manipulations in this
family can be unambiguously ranked in terms of efficiency and revenue.22 In particular, the
behavior with the most pooling, with v˜ = 0.6, generates the lowest efficiency and revenue
for the seller, but yields the largest ex ante rents for the cartel.
22All cartel manipulations in the family are interim Pareto undominated, which is why they all constitute
optimal cartel behaviors.
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Figure 5: Distribution of winning bids under first-price auction with or without collusion
Figure 5 compares the distribution of winning bids under a collusion-free outcome and the
cartel manipulation with most pooling. We have randomly drawn 10,000 pairs of valuations
according to the above density function, and analyzed behavior under a first-price auction.23
As seen in the figure, collusive bids are double-peaked despite the single-peaked density:
bidder types pooling at the reserve price results in a spike of bids at the reserve price and
absence of bids just above it; other types bid competitively and generate a higher peak of bids
around 0.5. This example illustrates how one can potentially use our theory to empirically
detect a cartel; but it also suggests how failing to control for possible collusion may lead to
biased estimates of bidders’ valuations.
If the seller herself implements an auction which induces minimal pooling — with v˜ =
0.541, the resulting auction will satisfy (PS) and (NW) and it will not be any further sus-
ceptible to a cartel. The resulting outcome results in higher efficiency and revenue, due to
reduced pooling. This point suggests a sense in which the seller could benefit strictly from
intervention, beyond her choice of the reserve price. This motivates our next section.
5 Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions
In this section, we look for an auction that maximizes the seller’s revenue among all winner-
payable WCP auctions. This exercise is not trivial; as Corollary 2 shows, in a wide range
of circumstances the auction that maximizes the seller’s revenue in the absence of collusion
will not be collusion-proof.
23The 0 bid in x-axis of Figure 5 represents non-participation.
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To begin, observe first that Corollary 5 and Theorem 1 imply that there is no loss of
generality in restricting attention to WCP auctions where bidders do not wish to manipulate
the outcome. Next, write Ji(vi) := vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) for the virtual valuation of bidder i with
value vi, and henceforth assume, as standard, that it is strictly increasing. Theorem 1 allow
us to represent a winner payable WCP auction by a direct mechanism that satisfies (PS)
and (NW). Specifically, the seller’s problem becomes
[P ] max
(qi,ti)i∈N
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
Ji(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi)
subject to (M), (Env), (PS), and (NW), given a reserve price ri = inf{ ti(v)qi(v) | qi(v) > 0} for
each i ∈ N . The objective function represents the seller’s expected revenue.24
Our main result identifies the optimal weakly collusion-proof auction up to the choice
of the reserve prices (r1, . . . , rn). To state our result, we need to introduce some further
notation. Recall first that V0i (ri) ⊂ [ri, vi] denotes the set of susceptible types. Note that
V0i (ri) ⊂ [ri, vi] is a disjoint union of countably many intervals Iki = [aki , bki ], k ∈ Ki ⊂ N,
for which Gi is linear. Then, for every bidder i, we define the “ironed” virtual valuation as
follow:
J¯i(vi) :=

Ji(vi) if vi ∈ Vi\V0i (ri)∫ bki
ak
i
Ji(s)dFi(s)
Fi(bki )−Fi(aki )
if vi ∈ Iki for some k ∈ Ki.
(9)
The ironed virtual valuation is constant within each interval Iki for which (PS) requires
bidder i to receive the object with a constant probability. For any value in Iki , it coincides
with the conditional expected value of the virtual valuation in that interval.25
The following result shows that the optimal allocation rule is the one that, under optimal
reserve prices, always assigns the object to the bidder with the highest ironed virtual value.
As standard, the payoff equivalence allows us to focus on the allocation rule only.
Theorem 3. For any v ∈ V, let W (v) := {j ∈ N | J¯j(vj) = maxk∈N J¯k(vk)} and let #W (v)
denote the cardinality of this set. Then, there is an auction rule (q∗i , t∗i )i∈N that solves [P ]
24It is well known that the expression is obtained by substituting for the payments Ti into the original
objective function using the condition (Env) and noting that (IR′) must be binding at the optimum for the
lowest types, i.e., for all i ∈ N , Ti(vi) = viQi(vi). In the above expression we also used the facts that
Qi(vi) = 0 for all vi < ri.
25The idea of ironing is in the spirit of Myerson (1981). In our case, ironing is needed to deal with the
collusion-proofness constraint even though the virtual valuation is increasing; in Myerson (1981), ironing is
required to satisfy the the monotonicity constraint that becomes binding in regions where the virtual value
is decreasing.
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such that ri ≥ J−1i (0) := inf{v ≥ vi : Ji(v) ≥ 0},∀i ∈ N , and where
q∗i (v) =
0 if vi < ri or J¯i(vi) < maxj∈N J¯j(vj)1
#W (v)
if vi ≥ ri and i ∈ W (v).
(10)
Proof. See Appendix B (page 40).
The theorem characterizes the optimal WCP auction up to the choice of reserve prices.
Therefore, once the allocation is chosen according to Theorem 3 for each (r1, . . . , rn), the
revenue maximizing WCP auction is obtained by choosing (r1, . . . , rn) to maximize the re-
sulting objective function in [P ]. Note that ri ≥ J−1i (0) for all i ∈ N follows immediately as
inspection of [P ] reveals that it is never optimal for the seller to sell to bidders with negative
virtual valuations.
To understand this result, observe that the optimal auction under the threat of collusion
is constructed exactly as the optimal auction in Myerson (1981), except that the seller is
forced to pool together susceptible types so as to satisfy (PS). The pooling of susceptible
types means that their average virtual value becomes the relevant criterion for these types
in the revenue maximization.
We can obtain a more complete characterization of the optimal auction by focusing on two
special cases (a) nondecreasing density (b) symmetric auction with single-peaked density.26
5.1 Monotone Nondecreasing Densities
If all bidders have nondecreasing densities, then for any ri ∈ [vi, vi], the function Gi will be
linear in [ri, vi]. Hence, bidder i must expect a constant probability of obtaining the object
for all his values above ri. This implies that the seller’s problem takes on a much simpler
form.
Corollary 6. Suppose that all fi’s are nondecreasing. Then, the program [P ] simplifies to
max
(ri)i∈N
[∑
i∈N
( ∏
j:pi(j)<pi(i)
Fj(rj)
)
(1− Fi(ri)) ri
]
, (11)
where pi : N → N is any permutation function that satisfies pi(j) < pi(i) if rj > ri.
Proof. See Appendix B (page 43).
26We have already argued that if all bidders have monotone decreasing density, then the Myerson’s revenue
maximizing auction is WCP (see Corollary 4).
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Interestingly, Corollary 6 suggests that the optimal WCP auction can be implemented
via a sequential negotiation process. Bidders are ordered from first to last and the seller
approaches them in sequence and makes them take-it-or-leave-it offers. If bidder i refuses
the offer, the seller proceeds to make an offer to the next bidder; and the process continues
until either some bidder j accepts an offer and pays rj to the seller, or the object remains
unsold. Not surprisingly, the seller’s optimal offer falls with each rejected offer and the last
bidder in the sequence, say i, must receive an offer at price J−1i (0).27
This result suggests that the seller can compute optimal reserve prices, recursively, for
all possible orders of bidders and then select the order that is optimal. The order becomes
irrelevant when bidders are ex-ante symmetric, and the problem is further simplified in this
case as illustrated by the next corollary, which is stated without proof.
Corollary 7. Suppose that fi = f for all i ∈ N and f is nondecreasing. Then, it is an
optimal WCP auction to approach all bidders in sequence (i.e., in any arbitrary sequence)
and offer to the k-th buyer a price rk that maximizes
rk(1− F (rk)) + F (rk)Vn−k,
where Vn−k is the revenue the seller gets from an subproblem dealing only with n− k bidders
(and V0 = 0).
One insight that emerges from this corollary is that, contrary to Myerson (1981), reserve
prices in an optimal WCP auction may be different even when bidders are ex-ante symmetric.
To see this point, consider the recursive nature of the problem. It is straightforward to see
that 0 = V0 < V1 < · · · < Vn−1, which implies that rn = J−1n (0) < rn−1 < · · · < r1. Therefore,
the optimal reserve price charged to bidder i will be different from the one charged to bidder
j, for any i, j ∈ N . For instance, suppose there are three bidders, 1,2 and 3, with valuations
drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. Then, the optimal policy for the seller is to make take-it-or-
leave-it offers of r1 = 89/128, r2 = 5/8, r3 = 1/2, sequentially to the three bidders. This
yields revenue of 0.4835, 10.5% higher than the revenue 0.4375 that the seller obtains if she
selects a revenue maximizing auction and the cartel optimally responds by pooling all bidder
types above the reserve price.28
The optimality of treating ex ante identical bidders asymmetrically extends beyond this
case. Because virtual valuations are strictly increasing, optimal price discrimination calls for
27This is the optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer for a single bidder, which also corresponds to i’s reserve price
in the Myerson’s optimal auction without collusion.
28The optimal revenue is also 2.3 % higher than the revenue of 0.4725 that would have obtained if the
seller charged the optimal posted price r = 1/ 3
√
4 which is what MM prescribed for the seller facing a cartel
that forms at the ex-ante stage.
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assigning the object to bidders with the highest values. However, the collusion-proof con-
straint makes this allocation infeasible. The asymmetric allocation, implicit in the sequential
negotiation, accomplishes partial price discrimination without violating the collusion-proof
constraint.
5.2 Single-Peaked Density and Symmetric Auctions
Suppose now that bidders are ex-ante symmetric and that the (common) virtual valuation J
is strictly increasing. In addition, assume that the (common) density f is (weakly) increasing
in [v, vˆ] and strictly decreasing [vˆ, v] around a peak vˆ ∈ [v, v]. Let vˆ > rM := J−1(0) to avoid
the trivial result in which the Myerson’s optimal auction is WCP. Observe that for any
ri ≥ vˆ, there exists v∗(ri) ≤ vˆ such that V0i (ri) = [ri, v∗(ri)] (recall Figure 3), and also that
v∗(ri) is decreasing in ri and satisfies v∗(vˆ) = vˆ.29
The single-peaked density case allows us to illustrate how the choice of the reserve prices
interacts with the (endogenous) level of ironing at the optimal mechanism. Moreover, the case
of single-peaked density covers a general class of many plausible and well-known distributions,
including Uniform, Triangular, Cauchy, Exponential, Logistic, Normal, and Weibull.
While a general optimal mechanism (which by Theorem 3 must be asymmetric) is of
interest, it is also useful to consider an optimal auction among collusion-proof winner-payable
auctions that treat bidders in a non-discriminatory way.30 Nondiscriminatory, or symmetric,
auctions are of practical interest since sellers, particularly government agencies, are often
compelled to treat bidders identically. Theorem 3 characterizes the optimal WCP auction
even in this case. Formally, in addition to the assumptions that bidders are ex-ante symmetric
and that the density is single-peaked, we impose a symmetry requirement that Qi = Q for
all i ∈ N .31
Under the stated assumptions, for any reserve price r ≤ vˆ (which must be the same for
all bidders), there is a value v∗(r) ∈ [vˆ, v] such that the concave closure of F on the interval
[r, v] is linear in [r, v∗(r)] and strictly concave in [v∗(r), v].
29The proof of these statements is straightforward and thus omitted.
30The solution to the asymmetric optimal WCP auction problem for the single-peaked density case is
omitted to save space but is contained in a working-paper version which is available upon request.
31Deb and Pai (2013) study auctions where the allocation and payment rule cannot depend on the identity
of bidders and show that almost any interim allocation can be implemented using anonymous auctions. In
contrast, we require the expected final outcome to be nondiscriminatory for ex-ante identical bidders.
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Corollary 8. The allocation that solves [P ] under the additional symmetry restriction is:
q∗i (v) =

1
#{j∈N | vj=maxk∈N vk} if vi = maxj∈N vj > v
∗(r)
1
#{j∈N | vj∈[r,v∗(r)]} if vi ∈ [r, v∗(r)] and maxj∈N vj ≤ v∗(r)
0 otherwise,
(12)
where r is a value in (rM , vˆ].
Proof. See Appendix B (page 43).
Again, the characterization here is up to the choice of the reserve price. The auction
allocates the object efficiently when bidders have high valuations, but allocates it randomly
at a fixed price when bidders have low values. The optimal reserve price exceeds rM since
the region of efficient allocation [v∗(r), v] expands as r rises (and the seller benefits from this
expansion). Formally, suppose the reserve price is raised from r = rM to rM +ε. This entails
only a second-order loss from withheld sale to the types in [rM , rM + ε] since in that region
virtual values are close to zero, but it results in the object being allocated efficiently among
types [v∗(rM + ε), v∗(rM)], which generates a first-order gain.
The optimal symmetric WCP auction given by (12) can be implemented by the following
simple mechanism: First, hold either a first-price or second-price auction with a minimum
bid m that satisfies [v∗(r)− r]Q = [v∗(r)−m]F (v∗(r))n−1, where Q := F (v∗)n−F (r)n
n(F (v∗)−F (r)) denotes
the constant winning probability for type v ∈ [r, v∗(r)].32 If the object is not sold in the
auction, then the object is offered for sale at price r, with ties broken by a fair lottery (in
case there are multiple buyers at that price).33 As noted in the Introduction, this mechanism
resembles the Italian procurement system which allows a procurer to negotiate with suppliers
after an initial auction fails to attract a successful bid.
6 Related Literature
Seminal contributions to the literature on collusion in auctions include Robinson (1985),
Graham and Marshall (1987), von Ungern-Stenberg (1988), Mailath and Zemsky (1991),
and MM. Like us, they analyze cartel profitability at a single-unit auction and abstract from
32One can think of m as a reserve price in the conventional sense; we do not use the term to avoid
confusion with the way we defined the term.
33Observe that the type v∗(r) is indifferent between obtaining the object in the auction at the minimum
price m and obtaining it in the posted-price sale at price r. Our characterization implies that in the case of
the previous subsection, where all densities are increasing, an optimal symmetric auction would consist of
posting a single price.
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the enforcement issue—how members of a cartel may sustain collusion without a legally
binding contract.34 Unlike us, most of these authors focus on strong cartels and/or specific
auction formats.
MM does consider weak cartels and show that they involve random allocation of the
object for sale, much consistent with often observed practice of bid rotation.35 Our approach
is differentiated by its explicit consideration of the bidders’ interim incentive to participate
in the cartel. Besides, our model is more general than MM in several respects. First, we
consider a more general class of auctions called “winner-payable auctions.” Considering such
a general class of auctions helps to isolate the features of auctions that make them vulnerable
to cartels. Second, we relax the monotone hazard rate and symmetry assumptions.
Several authors study tacit collusion through repeated interaction (see Aoyagi (2003),
Athey et al. (2004), Blume and Heidhues (2004), and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004))
or via implicit collusive strategies (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (2005), Brusco and
Lopomo (2002), Marshall and Marx (2007, 2009), Garratt et al. (2009)). If types are dis-
tributed independently over time, repeated interaction enables members of a weak cartel to
use their future market shares in a way similar to monetary transfers. If the types are per-
sistent over time, as we envision to be more realistic, however, tampering with future market
shares involves severe efficiency loss (see Athey and Bagwell (2008)). Indeed, assuming that
bidders can commit to intertemporal collusive scheme and rely on explicit communication,
our analysis remains valid for a sequence of second-price (or any ex-post implementable)
auctions if types are fully persistent and the target equilibrium is a repetition of the stage
game equilibrium.36
The current paper is also related to the literature that studies collusion-proof mechanism
34The likely scenario of enforcement involves the threat of retaliation through future interaction, multi-
market contact, or organized crime.
35See also Condorelli (2012). This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of a single object to a number of
agents when payments made to the designer are socially wasteful and cannot be redistributed. The problem
addressed is analogous to that of a cartel-mediator designing an ex-ante optimal weak cartel agreement at a
standard auction with no reserve price.
36This result follows from a couple of observations. First, with persistent types, the bidders’ payoffs from
any intertemporal collusive scheme can also be implemented by repeating some static collusive scheme in
every period. Second, a second-price auction guarantees that the stage outcome of non-cooperative, truthful,
bidding is constant across periods, which means that the non-collusive payoff in the repeated auctions is equal
to that in the static one-shot auction (up to appropriate discounting). As a result, the comparison between
collusive and noncollusive payoffs in the repeated auctions is no different from that in the static one-shot
auction. Refer to Section V of the Supplementary Material for details. We expect this result does not hold
for the first-price auction in which, as the auction is repeated, bidders update their beliefs and adjust their
bidding behavior accordingly, which means the second observation above would fail.
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design. This literature, pioneered by Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) and further gener-
alized by Che and Kim (2006, 2009), models cartel as designing an optimal mechanism for its
members (given the underlying auction mechanism they face), assuming that the members
have necessary wherewithal to enforce whatever agreement they make. Similar to Laffont
and Martimort (1997, 2000) and Che and Kim (2006), we explicitly consider the bidders’
incentives to participate in the cartel. Unlike the current paper, though, their models allow
a cartel to be formed only after bidders decide, noncooperatively, to enter the auction. This
modeling assumption, while realistic in some internal organization setting, is not applicable
to auction environments where the collusion often centers around withdrawing participation.
Che and Kim (2009) and Pavlov (2008) do consider collusion on participation. And they
show that the second-best outcome (i.e., the Myerson (1981) benchmark) can be achieved
even in the presence of a strong cartel, as long as the second-best outcome involves a sufficient
amount of exclusion of bidders. However, the auction that accomplishes this requires losing
bidders to pay, violating the ex-post individual rationality. Such auctions, while theoretically
interesting, are never observed in practice. By contrast, the current paper has considered a
more realistic, still broad, class of auctions rules.
7 Conclusion
The current paper analyzes weak cartels in auctions. Unlike the seminal work by McAfee and
McMillan (1992), we explicitly consider the interim incentives of bidders to participate in a
cartel. This perspective leads to a different characterization of when auctions are susceptible
to a weak cartel, how a cartel would operate if it is active, and how the auctioneer should
respond to a weak cartel.
We show that a large class of auction rules, called winner-payable, are susceptible to a
weak cartel if and only if they seek to implement non-constant allocation for “susceptible”
types, roughly those for which the distribution is locally nonconcave. This characterization
stands in sharp contrast to the existing theory of MM. While the latter suggests that a (first-
price sealed-bid) auction is susceptible to a cartel whenever a bidder’s value distribution
satisfies a nondecreasing hazard rate, a condition satisfied by most standard distribution
functions, the condition we identify for vulnerability to a cartel is much stronger, and not
necessarily satisfied by all standard distribution functions. In particular, standard auctions as
well as classical revenue-maximizing auctions are never susceptible to weak cartels if bidders’
distribution functions are strictly concave. Furthermore, we use our characterization to
identify optimal weakly collusion-proof auctions. In case the bidders’ distribution is single-
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peaked, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a competitive auction at a high
reserve price followed by a sequential negotiation in case of the auction producing no sale.
Our results rest on the model of collusion in which bidders coordinate their actions
to interim Pareto dominate a noncooperative outcome. While this model is a reasonable
approximation of cartel behavior in many settings, questions arise as to whether our results
are robust to the specific ways in which a cartel is formed (e.g., whether a cartel is all-
inclusive or not, who proposes an agreement) and how it operates (i.e., whether members
can commit to punish a defector or what beliefs they form in case a cartel collapses). These
questions will constitute a worthy subject of future research.
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A Proof for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of Necessity: We provide separate proofs for the necessity of (PS) and (NW)
while proving the former first. The proof of both results employs the following result (see
Mierendorff (2011) or Che et al. (2013)):
Lemma 2. For any interim rule (Qi)i∈N , there exists an ex-post allocation rule that has Q
as an interim allocation rule if and only if
g(v) := 1−
∏
i∈N
Fi(vi)−
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
vi
Qi(s)dFi(s) ≥ 0,∀v = (vi)i∈N ∈ V . (B)
Necessity of (PS): Fix an equilibrium outcome MA = (q, t) of an auction A ∈ A∗ and let
(Q, T ) denote its interim outcome. Suppose for a contradiction that MA is WCP but Qk is
not constant in some interval (a′, b′) ⊂ (rk, vk] for some k ∈ N , where Gk is linear. Let (a, b)
be the maximal (connected) interval in [rk, vk] containing (a′, b′) on which Gk is linear. Note
that Fk(s) = Gk(s) at s = a, b.
Let us define Q˜ = (Q˜1, · · · , Q˜n) as follows:
Q˜i(vi) =
p¯ if i = k and vi ∈ (a, b)Qi(vi) otherwise , (13)
where p¯ is defined to satisfy
p¯(Fk(b)− Fk(a)) =
∫ b
a
Qk(s)dFk(s). (14)
Observe first that Q˜ satisfies (M). For this, we only need to check that Qk(a) ≤ p¯ =∫ b
a Qk(s)dFk(s)
Fk(b)−Fk(a) ≤ Qk(b), which clearly holds since Qk is nondecreasing.
Claim 1. The interim allocation rule Q˜ satisfies (B) and thus admits an ex-post allocation
rule.
Proof. Since Q satisfies (B), it suffices to show that for all v = (v1, · · · , vn) ∈ V ,∑
i∈N
∫ vi
vi
Q˜i(s)dFi(s) ≤
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
vi
Qi(s)dFi(s),
which, given (13), will hold if for all vk ∈ [vk, vk],∫ vk
vk
Q˜k(s)dFk(s) ≤
∫ vk
vk
Qk(s)dFk(s). (15)
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Note that (15) clearly holds for vk ≥ b since Q˜k(s) = Qk(s), ∀s ∈ [b, vk]. Let us pick vk ∈ [a, b)
and then we obtain as desired∫ vk
vk
Q˜k(s)dFk(s) =
∫ b
vk
p¯dFk(s) +
∫ vk
b
Qk(s)dFk(s)
=
[
Fk(b)− Fk(vk)
Fk(b)− Fk(a)
] ∫ b
a
Qk(s)dFk(s) +
∫ vk
b
Qk(s)dFk(s)
≤
∫ b
vk
Qk(s)dFk(s) +
∫ vk
b
Qk(s)dFk(s) =
∫ vk
vk
Qk(s)dFk(s), (16)
where the second equality follows from the definition of p¯, and the inequality from the fact
that Qk(·) is nondecreasing and thus∫ b
a
Qk(s)
Fk(b)− Fk(a)dFk(s) ≤
∫ b
vk
Qk(s)
Fk(b)− Fk(vk)dFk(s).
Also, for vk < a, we have∫ vk
vk
Q˜k(s)dFk(s) =
∫ a
vk
Qk(s)dFk(s) +
∫ vk
a
Q˜k(s)dFk(s)
≤
∫ a
vk
Qk(s)dFk(s) +
∫ vk
a
Qk(s)dFk(s) =
∫ vk
vk
Qk(s)dFk(s),
where the inequality follows from (16). Thus, we can invoke Lemma 2 to conclude that Q˜
admits an ex-post allocation rule.
Let q˜ denote an ex post allocation rule that has Q˜ as the interim allocation rule. Next,
we use the interim allocation Q˜ and (Env) to construct an interim payment rule T˜ satisfying
T˜i(ri) = Ti(ri),∀i ∈ N . Given this, we construct an (ex post) payment rule t˜ defined by
t˜i(v) = q˜i(v)
T˜i(vi)
Q˜i(vi)
. (17)
Clearly, Ev−i [t˜i(v)] = T˜i(vi). The direct mechanism M˜A = (q˜, t˜) thus has (Q˜, T˜ ) as the interim
rule. By construction, M˜A satisfies (IC). We next show that it satisfies (C-IR).
Claim 2. M˜A satisfies (C-IR).
Proof. First, it is clear that all bidders other than k will have their payoffs unaffected.
Moreover, bidder k’s payoff will only be affected when his value is above a. To show that
U M˜Ak (vk) ≥ UMAk (vk) for all vk ∈ [a, vk], with strict inequality for some vk, it suffices to show
that U M˜Ak (b) ≥ UMAk (b), since U M˜Ak is linear in [a, b] while UMAk is convex but not linear, and
since Q˜k(vk) = Qk(vk) for all vk ∈ (b, vk] so U˜MAk and UMAk have the same slope beyond b.
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To do so, we let Vˆk ⊂ [rk, vk] denote the (countable) set of points at which Qk is discon-
tinuous (i.e., jumps up). Given the nondecreasing Qk and the concave closure Gk of Fk over
the interval [a, b] ∈ [rk, vk], we obtain∫ b
a
Qk(s)(fk(s)− gk(s))ds
=Qk(s)(Fk(s)−Gk(s))
∣∣∣b−
a+
−
∑
v∈Vˆk∩(a,b)
Qk(s)(Fk(s)−Gk(s))
∣∣∣v+
v−
−
∫ b
a
Q′k(s)(Fk(s)−Gk(s))ds
=
∑
v∈Vˆk∩(a,b)
(Qk(v+)−Qk(v−))(Gk(v)− Fk(v)) +
∫ b
a
Q′k(s)(Gk(s)− Fk(s))ds ≥ 0,
where v− and v+ denote the left and right limit, respectively. Here the second equality
follows from the fact that Fk(s) = Gk(s) at s = a, b and Fk and Gk are continuous, while
the inequality from the fact that Qk is nondecreasing and Gk(s) ≥ Fk(s),∀s. By the above
inequality and the fact that gk is constant over the interval [a, b], we obtain∫ b
a
Qk(s)fk(s)ds ≥
∫ b
a
Qk(s)gk(s)ds
=
(∫ b
a
Qk(s)ds
)(
Gk(b)−Gk(a)
b− a
)
=
(∫ b
a
Qk(s)ds
)(
Fk(b)− Fk(a)
b− a
)
,
which yields
p¯ =
∫ b
a
Qk(s)fk(s)ds
Fk(b)− Fk(a) ≥
∫ b
a
Qk(s)ds
b− a .
Thus, we obtain
U M˜Ak (b)− U M˜Ak (a) = p¯(b− a) ≥
∫ b
a
Qk(s)ds = U
MA
k (b)− UMAk (a).
or U M˜Ak (b) ≥ UMAk (b) since U M˜Ak (a) = UMAk (a).
Given Claim 2, the desired contradiction will follow if we show that M˜A can be imple-
mented via a weak cartel manipulation. To this end, let B˜i(vi) := T˜i(vi)Q˜i(vi) if vi ∈ [ri, vi] and
B˜i(vi) := 0 otherwise.37 We then exploit the winner-payability property to establish the
following result.
Claim 3. Given the winner-payability of A, for any given vi ∈ [ri, vi], there exists zi(vi) ∈
[0, 1], such that
zi(vi)τi(b
i) + (1− zi(vi))τi(bi) = B˜i(vi). (18)
37Note that ri = inf{vi ∈ Vi | Q˜i(vi) > 0} = inf{vi ∈ Vi |Qi(vi) > 0}.
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Proof. First, we show that
Bi(ri) ≤ B˜i(vi) ≤ Bi(vi),∀vi ∈ [ri, vi],∀i, (19)
where Bi(vi) = Ti(vi)Qi(vi) for vi ∈ [ri, vi]. This is immediate if i 6= k or if i = k and vk ∈ [vk, a]
since in those cases, Bi(vi) = B˜i(vi) and Bi is nondecreasing.
Consider now i = k and any vk ∈ (a, vk]. The first inequality of (19) holds trivially. To
prove the latter inequality, it suffices to show that B˜i(vi) ≤ Bi(vi), since B˜i(·) is nondecreas-
ing. This inequality holds trivially if vk = b since Bk(b) ≥ Bk(a) = B˜k(a) = B˜k(b). If vk > b,
then Qk(vk) = Q˜k(vk) and also
T (vk)− T˜ (vk) = vkQk(vk)− vkQ˜k(vk) + U M˜Ak (vk)− UMAk (vk) = U M˜Ak (vk)− UMAk (vk) ≥ 0.
This implies Bi(vi) ≥ B˜i(vi).
Next, we observe that for any vi ∈ [ri, vi],
inf
{τi(b)
ξi(b)
| ξi(b) > 0, b ∈ B
} ≤ Bi(vi) ≤ sup{τi(b)
ξi(b)
| ξi(b) > 0, b ∈ B and τi(b)
ξi(b)
≤ vi
}
.
By definition, τi(bi) and τi(b
i
) equal respectively the first and the last terms in the above
inequalities. Combining this with (19) means that for each vi ∈ [ri, vi], B˜i(vi) ∈ [τi(bi), τi(bi)],
which guarantees the existence of zi(vi) as in (18).
It remains to show that M˜A is a cartel manipulation. To this end, we construct a cartel
agreement α that implements M˜A in the sense of (4). Recall that α(v)(b) corresponds to the
probability that the cartel submits a bid profile b given the report of type profile v. For each
v ∈ V and zi(v) satisfying (19), let
α(v)(b) =

q˜i(v)zi(vi) for b = bi
q˜i(v)(1− zi(vi)) for b = bi
1−∑i∈N q˜i(v) for b = b0.
(20)
Under this cartel agreement, given profile v ∈ V of (reported) values, bidder i obtains the
object with probability q˜i(v) and pays q˜i(v)B˜i(vi) in expectation. Hence, for each v ∈ V ,
q˜i(v) = Eα(v)[ξi(b)] and t˜i(v) = q˜i(v)B˜i(vi) = Eα(v)[τi(b)],
as it remained to be shown.
Necessity of (NW): We begin by introducing a few notation. For any v, v′ ∈ V , we
denote v ≥ v′ if vi ≥ v′i,∀i ∈ N , and v > v′ if v ≥ v′ and v 6= v′. We will also denote
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F−i(v−i) =
∏
j 6=i Fj(vj) to simplify notation. For any v ∈ V , let V i(vi) = [vi, vi] × V−i and
V(v) = ∪i∈NV i(vi) (that is, V(v) is the set of value profiles v′ ∈ V such that v′i ≥ vi for at
least one i ∈ N).
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For any v = (vi)i∈N ≥ r, g(v) = 0 if and only if
∑
i:v′i≥vi qi(v
′) = 1 for almost
every v′ ∈ V(v).
Proof. Fix any v ≥ r and observe
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
vi
Qi(s)dFi(s) =E
[∑
i∈N
qi(v
′) · 1{v′∈Vi(vi)}
]
≤E
[(∑
i∈N
qi(v
′)
)
· 1{v′∈V(v)=∪i∈NVi(vi)}
]
(21)
≤E [1{v′∈V(v)}] = 1−∏
i∈N
Fi(vi). (22)
Note that the first inequality becomes strict if
∑
i∈N qi(v
′) >
∑
i:v′i≥vi qi(v) while the second
inequality becomes strict if
∑
i∈N qi(v
′) < 1. This gives the desired result.
Suppose now for a contradiction that Q fails (NW), which implies by Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 that g(r) > 0. We first construct an interim allocation Q˜ for manipulation.
Lemma 4. For any interim allocation rule Q = (Qi)i∈N for which Qi(vi) = 0,∀vi < ri,∀i ∈ N
and g(r) > 0, we can construct an alternative allocation rule Q˜ = (Q˜i)i∈N satisfying the
following properties: for each i ∈ N ,
(a) Q˜i(vi) = 0,∀vi < ri ;
(b) Q˜i(vi) ≥ Qi(vi),∀vi ∈ Vi, which holds strictly for some i ∈ N and a positive measure
of vi’s;
(c) Q˜i satisfies (M), that is, it is non-decreasing;
(d) Q˜ satisfies (B).
Proof. Let us now prove a preliminary result:
Claim 4. Consider any interim allocation rule (Qi)i∈N satisfying the assumptions in the
statement of this lemma. Then,
(i) g(v) > 0 for for any v  r;
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(ii) If g(v) = g(v˜) = 0, then g(v ∧ v˜) = 0, where v ∧ v˜ is the component-wise minimum of
the two vectors v and v˜.
Proof. The statement (i) is obvious if vi = vi for some i ∈ N . Assume thus that vi > ri,∀i ∈
N. Observe first that since Qi(vi) = 0,∀vi < ri, g(v) is strictly decreasing in vi at any v with
vi < ri. Given any v = (vi)i∈N  r, consider v′ = (v′i)i∈N such that v′i = vi if vi ≥ ri while
vi = ri if vi < ri. Given the above observation and the fact that v′ ∈ ×i∈N [ri, vi], we have
g(v) > g(v′) ≥ 0.
To prove (ii), note that V(v ∧ v˜) = V(v) ∪ V(v˜). Thus, by Lemma 3 and the assumption
g(v) = g(v˜) = 0, if v ∈ V(v ∧ v˜), then we have either∑i:v′i≥vi qi(v′) = 1 for almost every v′ ∈
V(v) or ∑i:v′i≥v˜i qi(v′) = 1 for almost every v′ ∈ V(v˜), which means ∑i:v′i≥min{vi,v˜i} qi(v′) = 1
for almost every v′ ∈ V(v ∧ v˜). This implies g(v ∧ v˜) = 0 by (ii).
Since g(r) > 0 = g(v), one can find some vˆ > r such that g(vˆ) = 0 and g(v′) > 0 for any
v′ such that r ≤ v′ < vˆ. We first argue that for each i ∈ N , g(v′) > 0,∀v′ ∈ V\V i(vˆi) =
[vi, vˆi) × V−i. Suppose to the contrary that for some i ∈ N, we have g(v′) = 0 for some
v′ ∈ V\V i(vˆi). By (i) of Claim 4, we must have v′ ≥ r, which implies that r ≤ (v′ ∧ vˆ) < vˆ
since v′i < vˆi. However, g(v′ ∧ vˆ) = 0 by Lemma 3, which contradicts the selection of vˆ.
We now construct an allocation rule for manipulation Q˜ = (Q˜i)i∈N satisfying the prop-
erties (a) to (d). Choose any i ∈ N such that vˆi > ri. We let Q˜j = Qj,∀j 6= i and
Q˜i(vi) = Qi(vi),∀vi ∈ Vi\(ri, vˆi). Clearly, Q˜ satisfies the property (a). We now construct Q˜i
on the interval (ri, vˆi) such that the other properties are satisfied. We consider two cases
depending on whether or not Qi is constant on (ri, vˆi).
Case of non-constant Qi: We can find some v′i ∈ (ri, vˆi) and ε > 0 such that v′i−ε ∈ (ri, vˆi)
and Qi(v′i − ε) < Qi(vi) while Qi is continuous at vi − ε. Define d1 = minv∈[ri,v′i]×V−i g(v).
Since g(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [ri, v′i]×V−i ⊂ [vi, vˆi)×V−i, g is continuous, and the set [ri, v′i]×V−i
is compact, we must have d1 > 0. Now let
Q˜i(vi) =
min{Qi(v′i − ε) + d1, Qi(v′i)} for vi ∈ [v′i − ε, v′i]Qi(vi) for vi ∈ (ri, v′i − ε) ∪ (v′i, vˆi).
Clearly, Q˜i satisfies (b) and (c). To check (d), let g˜ denote the same function as g except
that Qi is replaced by Q˜i. For any v ∈ V with vi ≥ v′i, we have g˜(v) = g(v), so (c) is trivially
satisfied. Thus, it suffices to check (c) for v ∈ [vi, v′i]× V−i. For any such v, we have
g˜(v) = 1−
∏
j∈N
Fj(vj)−
∑
j∈N
∫ vj
vj
Qj(s)dFj(s)−
∫ v′i
v′i−ε
[
Q˜i(s)−Qi(s)
]
dFi(s)
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≥ g(v)− d1 [Fi(v′i)− Fi(v′i − ε)] ≥ 0,
where the second inequality holds since g(v) ≥ d1 = minv˜∈[ri,v′i]×V−i g(v˜).
Case of constant Qi: Let Qi = Qi(vi),∀vi ∈ (ri, vˆi). We first argue that Qi < F−i(vˆ−i) ≤
Qi(vˆi). To do so, note first that since g(vˆ) = 0, by Lemma 3, we have
∑
j:vj≥vˆj qj(vˆi, v−i) =
qi(vˆi, v−i) = 1 for almost every (vˆi, v−i) such that v−i ≤ vˆ−i, which implies that Qi(vˆi) ≥
F−i(vˆ−i). Also, Qi < F−i(vˆ−i) since otherwise
g(vˆi, vˆ−i)− g(ri, vˆ−i) =
∫ vˆi
ri
∂g
∂s
(s, vˆ−i)ds =
∫ vˆi
ri
[
Qi − F−i(vˆ−i)
]
dFi(s) ≥ 0,
which means g(vˆ) ≥ g(ri, vˆ−i) > 0 (recall that g(v′) > 0 for any v′ ∈ [vi, vˆi)× V−i), yielding
a contradiction. Thus, Qi < F−i(vˆ−i) ≤ Qi(vˆi) as desired. Also, minv−i∈V−i g(ri, v−i) > 0 for
the same reason as in the previous case. Let d2 = min{F−i(vˆ−i) − Qi,minv−i∈V−i g(ri, v−i)}
and
Q˜i(vi) = Qi + d2,∀vi ∈ (ri, vˆi).
Since 0 < d2 ≤ Qi(vˆi) − Qi, Q˜i satisfies the properties (b) and (c). To check (d), observe
first that for any vi, v′i ∈ [ri, vˆi] and v−i,
g˜(vi, v−i) = g(vi, v−i)− d2[Fi(vˆi)− Fi(vi)] (23)
g(v′i, v−i) = g(vi, v−i) +
[
Qi − F−i(v−i)
]
[Fi(v
′
i)− Fi(vi)] . (24)
Considering first the case of v−i ∈ V−i satisfying F−i(v−i) ≥ Qi + d2, we have
g˜(vi, v−i) = g(vi, v−i)− d2 [Fi(vˆi)− Fi(vi)]
= g(vˆi, v−i) +
[
F−i(v−i)−Qi − d2
]
[Fi(vˆi)− Fi(vi)] ≥ g(vˆi, v−i) ≥ 0,
where the first two equalities follow from (23) and (24), respectively. For v−i satisfying
F−i(v−i) < Qi + d2,
g˜(vi, v−i) = g(vi, v−i)− d2 [Fi(vˆi)− Fi(vi)]
= g(ri, v−i) +
[
Qi − F−i(v−i)
]
[Fi(vi)− Fi(ri)]− d2 [Fi(vˆi)− Fi(vi)]
= g(ri, v−i)− d2 [Fi(vˆi)− Fi(ri)] +
[
Qi + d2 − F−i(v−i)
]
[Fi(vi)− Fi(ri)]
≥ g(ri, v−i)− d2 [Fi(vˆi)− Fi(ri)] ≥ 0,
where the first two equalities again follow from (23) and (24), while the second inequality
from the fact that g(ri, v−i) ≥ minv−i∈V−i g(ri, v−i) ≥ d2.
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Since Q˜ satisfies (B), there exists an ex-post allocation (q˜i)i∈N whose interim allocation
is Q˜. Next, we can use Q˜ and (Env) to construct an interim payment rule T˜ = (T˜i)i∈N
satisfying T˜i(ri) = Ti(ri) for all i ∈ N . Given Q˜ and T˜ , we can define an ex-post payment
rule (t˜i)i∈N as in (17). Then, a direct mechanism M˜A = (q˜, t˜) has (Q˜, T˜ ) as the interim rule.
We can then employ a collusive agreement α in (20) to generate M˜A. Lastly, we draw a
contradiction by showing that M˜A satisfies (IC) and (C-IR). First, (IC) is easily satisfied
since Q˜ satisfies (M). To check (C-IR), note first that UMAi (vi) = U
M˜A
i (vi) = 0, ∀vi < ri
while UMAi (ri) = Qi(ri)ri − Ti(ri) ≤ Q˜i(ri)ri − T˜i(ri) = U M˜Ai (ri) since Ti(ri) = T˜i(ri) and
Qi(ri) ≤ Q˜i(ri) by the property (b) of Lemma 4. For any vi > ri,
UMAi (vi) = U
MA
i (ri) +
∫ vi
ri
Qi(s)ds ≤ U M˜Ai (ri) +
∫ vi
ri
Q˜i(s)ds = U
M˜A
i (vi),
where the inequality holds due to (b) of Lemma 4. This inequality holds strictly for some
bidder i ∈ N and a positive measure of his types for whom the inequality in (b) of Lemma
4 holds strictly.
Proof of Sufficiency: Recall V0i (ri) = {v ∈ [ri, vi]|g′i(v) = 0} is the set of susceptible
types, and let V−i := [ri, vi]\V0i (ri) be the remaining set of types above ri in which gi is
strictly decreasing. We let VDi ⊂ Vi denote the set of types at which gi drops discontinuously.
Fix any regular auction A which induces an equilibrium satisfying (PS) and (NW). We
prove that A is unsusceptible to collusion.
Suppose for contradiction that there is a weak cartel manipulation M˜A = (q˜, t˜) implement-
ing an interim Pareto improvement. Since, by definition of ri, we have τi(b) ≥ ξi(b)vi,∀i ∈
N,∀b ∈ Bi M˜A is a weak manipulation of A, for each vi ≤ ri,
U M˜Ai (v) ≤ max
b∈Bi
ξi(b)vi − τi(b) ≤ max
b∈Bi
ξi(b)vi − ξi(b)ri ≤ 0,
so (C-IR) implies that U M˜Ai (v) = 0, for vi ≤ ri. That M˜A interim Pareto dominates MA
implies UMAi (vi) = 0, for vi ≤ ri. Then, the interim Pareto domination implies that
Xi(vi) := U
M˜A
i (vi)− UMAi (vi) =
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(s)−Qi(s))ds ≥ 0,∀i, vi. (25)
Next, by the condition (NW), we have∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi = 1−
∏
i∈N
Fi(ri).
It follows from this equality and Lemma 2 that∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
Q˜i(vi)fi(vi)dvi ≤ 1−
∏
i∈N
Fi(ri) =
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi,
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or ∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(vi)−Qi(vi))fi(vi)dvi ≤ 0. (26)
Meanwhile,∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(vi)−Qi(vi))fi(vi)dvi
=
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(vi)−Qi(vi))gi(vi)dvi −
(∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
(Q˜i(vi)−Qi(vi))[gi(vi)− fi(vi)]dvi
)
=
∑
i∈N
Xi(vi)gi(vi)− ∑
v∈VDi
[Xi(v)gi(v)]
v+
v− −
∫ vi
ri
Xi(vi)gi
′(vi)dvi

+
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈VD′i
[
(Gi(v)− Fi(v))(Q˜i(v)−Qi(v))
]v+
v−
+
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
(Gi(vi)− Fi(vi))[Q˜′i(vi)−Q′i(vi)]dvi
=
∑
i∈N
Xi(vi)gi(vi)− ∑
v∈VDi
Xi(v)(gi(v
+)− gi(v−))−
∫ vi
ri
Xi(vi)gi
′(vi)dvi

+
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈VD′i
(Gi(v)− Fi(v))
[
Q˜i(v
+)− Q˜i(v+)− (Qi(v+)−Qi(v−))
]
+
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
(Gi(vi)− Fi(vi))[Q˜′i(vi)−Q′i(vi)]dvi
≥0, (27)
where VD′i is the set of values at which either Q˜i or Qi jumps up. The first equality follows
from the integration by parts. The second equality holds since Xi, Gi and Fi are continuous.
The inequality holds since, for each i ∈ N , Xi(v) ≥ 0, g′i(v) ≤ 0 whenever it is well defined,
and gi(v+) − gi(v−) < 0 for each v ∈ VDi , and, whenever Gi(vi) > Fi(vi), Qi(v+) = Qi(v−)
(since Q satisfies (PS)), Q˜i(v+) ≥ Q˜i(v−) and Q′i(vi) = 0 ≤ Q˜′i(vi) (by the monotonicity of
Q˜i).
The last inequality combined with (26) means that the inequality must hold as equality,
which in turn implies that Xi(vi) = 0, and Xi(v) = 0 for a.e. v ∈ V−i for each i ∈ N .38
We now prove that U M˜Ai (v)− UMAi (v) =
∫ v
ri
(Q˜i(s)−Qi(s))ds = Xi(v) ≤ 0 for all v ≥ ri,
for all i ∈ N , which will have established the desired contradiction. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists v′ such that Xi(v′) > 0. Recall that Xi(ri) = Xi(vi) = 0 and that Xi is
38If Xi(v) > 0 for some v ∈ VDi , or for a positive measure set of v’s in V−i , then the inequality in (27)
becomes strict, a contradiction to (26).
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continuous, and differentiable on (ri, vi). By the mean value theorem, there exists v1 ∈ (ri, v′)
such that Xi(v1) > 0 and that X ′i(v1) = Q˜i(v1) − Qi(v1) > 0 and v2 ∈ (v′, vi) such that
Xi(v
2) > 0 and that X ′i(v2) = Q˜i(v2) − Qi(v2) < 0. It follows that there exist v′′ ∈ (v1, v2)
such that Xi(v′′) > 0, and X ′i(v) = Q˜i(v) − Qi(v) falls in v at v = v′′, meaning either
Q˜i(v) − Qi(v) jumps down at v = v′′ or Q˜′i(v′′) − Q′i(v′′) < 0. In either case, since Q˜i
is nondecreasing, Qi(v) must increase in v at v = v′′. This means that v′′ ∈ V−i by the
construction of Qi. But then the above observation implies that Xi(v′′) = 0, a contradiction.
We thus conclude that U M˜Ai (v)− UMAi (v) = Xi(v) ≤ 0 for all v, and i.
Proof of Corollary 1: Fix a bidder k for whom Gk is linear on some interval (a, b) with
b > r and a ≥ v. We show that in any standard auction, the winning probability of bidder
k is non-constant in the interval (max{a, r}, b), which will imply by Theorem 1 that the
auction is not WCP. Consider first the second-price and English auctions where each bidder
bids his value in the undominated strategy. The interim winning probability of bidder k
with vk ∈ (max{a, r}, b) is equal to Qk(vk) =
∏
i 6=k Fi(vk), which is strictly increasing in the
interval (max{a, r}, b).
Consider next the first-price auction (or Dutch auction since the two auctions are strate-
gically equivalent). Note first that in undominated strategy equilibrium, (i) no bidder bids
more than his value and (ii) no bidder puts an atom at any bid B if B wins with positive
probability. Letting βi denote bidder i’s equilibrium strategy, note also that βi is nonde-
creasing. Given (i), we must have Qk(vk) > 0 for all vk ∈ (max{a, r}, b) since he can always
bid some amount B ∈ (max{a, r}, vk) and enjoy a positive payoff. Next, by (ii), there must
be some vk ∈ (max{a, r}, b) such that βk(vk) < βk(b) since otherwise βk(b) would be an atom
bid. For such vk, we must have Qk(vk) < Qk(b) so Qk is non-constant in (max{a, r}, b). To
see why, suppose to the contrary that Qk(vk) = Qk(b), which implies that no one else is
submitting any bid between βk(vk) and βk(b). Then, bidder k with value b can profitably
deviate to lower his bid below βk(b) but above βk(vk), a contradiction.
B Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 3: We first establish a two lemmas, Lemma 5 and 6. To do so, some
notation is first required. Given any vector r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ V , we write the allocation rule
in (10) as q∗(·; r) to make its dependence on r explicit. Next, we define
t∗i (v; r) = q
∗
i (v; r)vi −
∫ vi
vi
q∗i (si, v−i; r)dsi. (28)
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Then, from now on, we let M∗(r) denote a direct mechanism (q∗(·; r), t∗(·; r)). It is straight-
forward to see that M∗(r) is dominant-strategy implementable. For any r = (ri)i∈N ,
let [P ; r] be the same optimization program as [P ], except that it ignores the constraint
ri = inf{ t
∗
i (v;r)
q∗i (v;r)
| q∗i (v; r) > 0}, which we will refer to as the constraint (R) henceforth.
Lemma 5. For any r = (ri)i∈N with ri ≥ J−1(0),∀i ∈ N , the mechanism M∗(r) solves [P ; r].
Proof. We first prove that q∗(·; r) maximizes the objective function of [P ; r]. To do so, rewrite
the objective function by incorporating the collusion-proofness constraint into it: For each
i ∈ N and k ∈ Ki, define Qki = Qi(vi) and let Jki :=
∫ bki
ak
i
Ji(s)dFi(s)
Fi(bki )−Fi(aki )
if vi ∈ Iki . Then, express
the seller’s expected revenue as∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
Ji(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi)
=
∑
i∈N
∫
vi∈[ri,vi]\V0i (ri)
Ji(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi) +
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈Ki
∫ bki
aki
Ji(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi)
=
∑
i∈N
∫
vi∈[ri,vi]\V0i (ri)
Ji(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi) +
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈Ki
Qki
∫ bki
aki
Ji(vi)dFi(vi)
=
∑
i∈N
∫
vi∈[ri,vi]\V0i (ri)
Ji(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi) +
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈Ki
Jki Q
k
i (Fi(b
k
i )− Fi(bki ))
=
∑
i∈N
∫ vi
ri
J¯i(vi)Qi(vi)dFi(vi)
=E[
∑
i∈N
J¯i(vi)1{vi≥ri}qi(vi, v−i)].
The expression within the expectation operator above is maximized by the allocation rule
q∗i (·; r) for each realization v = (vi)i∈N .
It is clear that q∗(·; r) satisfies (NW). Since J¯i is (weakly) increasing, the interim allo-
cation rule resulting from q∗(·; r) satisfies (M). Also, (Env) is easily satisfied since M∗(r) is
dominant-strategy implementable. Lastly, the constraint (PS) is satisfied because the fact
that J¯i is constant over Iki implies all types in the interval Iki receive the object with a con-
stant probability under q∗i (·; r) for each i ∈ N . We thus conclude that M∗(r) solves [P ; r].
However, there is no guarantee that the mechanism M∗(r) satisfies the constraint (R).
The following result shows that starting from M∗(r) it is always possible to satisfy (R)
without reducing the seller’s revenue.
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Lemma 6. For any r = (ri)i∈N ∈ V, there exists rˆ ≥ r such that M∗(rˆ) satisfies (R) and
yields a (weakly) higher revenue for the seller than M∗(r).
Proof. As a first step, we prove the following claim:
Claim 5. For any r˜i ≥ ri, V0i (r˜i) ⊂ V0i (ri).
Proof. Consider any interval I = [a, b] ⊂ V0i (r˜i) on which Gi(·; r˜i) is linear. Then, for each
vi ∈ I, there is some s ∈ [0, 1] and v′i, v′′i ∈ [r˜i, vi] such that Gi(vi; r˜i) = sFi(v′i)+(1−s)Fi(v′′i ).
Since r˜i ≥ ri and thus v′i, v′′i ∈ [ri, vi], we have Gi(vi; ri) ≥ sFi(v′i) + (1− s)Fi(v′′i ) = Gi(vi; r˜i)
by definition of Gi(vi; ri). Thus, we have Gi(vi; ri) ≥ Gi(vi; r˜i) for all vi ∈ I. This implies
that Gi(·; ri) is also linear over the interval I since, if not, it must be the case that over some
subinterval of I, Gi(·, ri) is strictly concave and Gi(·, ri) = Fi(·) > Gi(·; r˜i), which cannot
happen due to the fact that Gi(·; r˜i) is the concave envelope of Fi. Thus, we have shown
that I ⊂ V0i (ri) so V0i (r˜i) ⊂ V0i (ri).
For any r = (ri)i∈N ∈ V , let Q∗(·; r) denote the interim allocation rule corresponding to
q∗(·; r), and define r∗i (r) := inf{vi ∈ Vi |Q∗i (vi; r) > 0}. (If Q∗i (·, r) ≡ 0, then let r∗i (r) = vi.)
Note that by construction of q∗(·; r), we have r∗i (r) ≥ ri,∀i ∈ N . Let pi∗(r) denote the seller’s
revenue that is generated by the mechanism M∗(r).
Now fix any r = (ri)i∈N and denote r1 = r. Define r2 ∈ V such that r2i = r∗i (r1) for
each i ∈ N . Then, we must have pi∗(r2) ≥ pi∗(r1). To see this, note that q∗(·; r1) satisfies all
the constraints of [P ; r2], in particular (PS) since, for each i ∈ N , Q∗i (vi; r1) = 0,∀vi ≤ r2i
and also since Q∗i (·; r1) is constant in each interval belonging to V0i (r2i ), which is because
V0i (r2i ) ⊂ V0i (r1i ) by Claim 5 and the fact that r2i = r∗i (r1) ≥ r1i . Thus, M∗(r1) cannot yield a
higher seller’s revenue than M∗(r2), which is a solution of [P ; r2]. Define recursively rn ∈ V
for all n ≥ 2 such that rni = r∗i (rn−1) for each i ∈ N . By following the same reasoning
as above, we have pi∗(rn) ≥ pi∗(rn−1) for all n ≥ 2. Also, the sequence (rn)n∈N is (weakly)
increasing in the set V , and thus has a limit rˆ ∈ V such that rˆi = r∗i (rˆ). Then, we have
pi∗(r) = pi∗(r1) ≤ pi∗(r2) ≤ · · · ≤ pi∗(rˆ).
It remains to show that M∗(rˆ) satisfies (R). Note first that for each vi > rˆi, we have
some v−i such that q∗i (vi, v−i; rˆ) > 0, since Q∗i (vi; rˆ) > 0. For such profile v = (vi, v−i),
we have t∗i (v; rˆ) ≤ q∗i (v; rˆ)vi or t
∗
i (v;rˆ)
q∗i (v;rˆ)
≤ vi. Since this is true for all vi > rˆi, we have
inf{ t∗i (v;rˆ)
q∗i (v;rˆ)
| q∗i (v; rˆ) > 0} ≤ rˆi. The desired result will follow if it is shown that this inequality
cannot be strict. To do so, note first that for any vi < rˆi, we have q∗i (vi, v−i; rˆ) = 0,∀v−i .
Also, for any vi ≥ rˆi,
t∗i (vi, v−i; rˆ) ≥ viq∗i (vi, v−i; rˆ)− (vi − rˆi)q∗i (vi, v−i; rˆ) = rˆiq∗i (vi, v−i; rˆ),∀v−i,
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where the inequality holds since q∗i (·, v−i; rˆ) is nondecreasing.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3. Consider any profile of reserve prices r˜ = (r˜i)i∈N
that results from solving [P ]. Then, the optimal revenue cannot be greater than that from
M∗(r˜) since M∗(r˜) solves [P ; r˜] according to Lemma 5. Then, by Lemma 6, one can find
a profile r such that M∗(r) satisfies all the constraints of [P ] and yields no less revenue for
the seller than M∗(r˜) does, which means that M∗(r) is a solution of [P ]. The proof that
ri ≥ J−1i (0),∀i ∈ N at the optimum of [P ] is straightforward and hence omitted.
Proof of Corollary 6: We first observe that∫ vi
ri
Ji(vi)dFi(vi) = (1− Fi(ri))ri,
which can be readily verified using the definition of Ji and integration-by-parts. Thus, for
any vi ∈ V0i (ri) = [ri, vi], we have J¯i(vi) = ri. Then, the allocation rule in (10) requires
allocating the object to bidder i if vi ≥ ri = J¯i(vi) > max{rj | vj ≥ rj = J¯j(vj) and j 6= i}.
This means that bidder i must always be given the priority to receive the object over bidder
j if ri > rj. In case ri = rj, the priority can be given to either of bidder i and j. (Note that
in the statement of Theorem 3 bidders with equal virtual values obtain the object with the
same probability; it is without loss to treat them asymmetrically as we do here). Let such
priority rule be denoted by a permutation function pi : N → N satisfying that pi(j) < pi(i)
if ri < rj. The interim allocation rule that results from this priority rule is then given as∏
j:pi(j)<pi(i) Fj(rj) for each bidder i with vi ≥ ri. Also, the seller’s expected revenue under
this interim allocation rule coincides with the expression within the square bracket of (11),
which must then be maximized by choosing r = (ri)i∈N optimally.
Proof of Corollary 8: First, by the symmetry of auction rule, we must have ri = r for all
i and some r ≥ rM . Let us consider the case where r ≤ vˆ (while we will see below that r ≤ vˆ
is required at the optimum). There is a value v∗(r) ≥ vˆ such that G is linear in [r, v∗(r)]
while it is strictly concave elsewhere, which implies that J¯(v) defined in (9) is constant for
v ∈ [r, v∗(r)] and strictly increasing for v > v∗(r). Using this, it is straightforward to see
that the allocation q∗i in (10) coincides with (12).
We now show that rM < r ≤ vˆ at the optimum. We first argue that r ≤ vˆ. If r > vˆ, then
there is no range where G is linear, which means that the corresponding optimal rule given
by (10) is the one which allocates the object efficiently among the bidders whose values are
greater than r. Clearly, this mechanism is revenue-dominated by a mechanism where r′ = vˆ
and the object is efficiently allocated to the bidders whose values are greater than r′, since
vˆ > rM so the extra revenue can be generated from selling to bidders with values in [vˆ, r].
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We next show that r > rM . Since we already know that r ≥ rM at the optimum, we need
to argue that r 6= rM at the optimum. Note first that the interim allocation rule is given by
Q∗(v) =

F (v)n−1 if v > v∗
F (v∗)n−F (r)n
n(F (v∗)−F (r)) =
∑n−1
k=0 F (v
∗)n−1−kF (r)k
n
if v ∈ [r, v∗]
0 otherwise.
The seller’s revenue from each bidder can then be written as
n
∫ v
r
J(v)Q∗(v)f(v)dv =
( n−1∑
k=0
F (v∗)n−1−kF (r)k
)∫ v∗
r
J(v)f(v)dv + n
∫ v
v∗
F (v)n−1J(v)f(v)dv.
Keeping in mind that v∗ is a function of r, we differentiate the above expressions with r, set
r = rM , and use J(rM) = 0 to obtain(
n−2∑
k=0
(n− 1− k)F (v∗)n−2−kF (rM)kf(v∗)
(
dv∗
dr
)
+
n−1∑
k=1
F (v∗)n−1−kF (rM)k−1f(rM)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= A
∫ v∗
rM
J(v)f(v)dv
+ J(v∗)
(
n−1∑
k=0
F (v∗)n−1−kF (rM)k − nF (v∗)n−1
)
f(v∗)
(
dv∗
dr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= B
.
It is straightforward to check that
A ≥
(
n−2∑
k=0
(n− 1− k)F (v∗)n−2−kF (rM)k
)
f(v∗)
(
dv∗
dr
)
=
−B
F (v∗)− F (r) .
Thus the above expressions is no less than(
J(v∗)−
∫ v∗
rM
J(v)f(v)dv
F (v∗)− F (rM)
)
B > 0,
where the strict inequality holds since v∗ > rM and dv∗
dr
> 0 imply B > 0. Thus, it is
profitable for the seller to raise r above rM .
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